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Auctioning the Upzone 
Christopher S. Elmendorf and Darien Shanske† 
Abstract 
This Article proposes a new framework for inducing cities with 
severely supply-constrained housing markets to allow a lot more high-
density housing. Local governments that rezone for larger buildings 
would (with the approval of a state agency) be permitted to auction, 
and thus profit from, the newly created buildable space. Winning 
bidders would acquire tradeable development allowances, which 
developers would have to acquire and redeem as a condition of project 
approval. We argue that this framework would expand the supply and 
density of urban housing through three channels. First, it would enable 
municipal governments to capture much more of the economic value 
created by upzoning and regulatory streamlining than they do today, 
which in turn would create new and better opportunities for local 
political entrepreneurs to assemble pro-development coalitions. Second, 
our framework would make local upzoning and regulatory streamlining 
deals more durable than they are today. This is so because local factions 
whose policy goals align with the state housing agency’s would be able 
to use auction contracts and state law to entrench their policies, and 
because the after-auction allowance market would act as a shock 
absorber, reducing allowance prices as necessary to offset regulatory 
and other shocks to the cost of development. Third, our framework 
would help to rectify informational asymmetries that presently hinder 
state oversight of local land-use plans. 
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Introduction 
This Article begins with a puzzle. Americans who identify as 
Democrats tend to have very different land-use preferences than those 
who identify as Republicans.1 Many Democrats, given their druthers, 
would prefer to live in dense, diverse, walkable communities; whereas 
Republicans generally favor the classic suburban ideal of single-family 
homes on large lots.2 These personal preferences line up with larger 
ideological commitments. Urban lifestyles have smaller carbon 
footprints,3 and diverse communities are more conducive to socio–
 
1. See Jonathan Mummolo & Clayton Nall, Why Partisans Do Not Sort: 
The Constraints on Political Segregation, 79 J. Pol. 45, 46–49 (2016) 
(reviewing literature). 
2. Id. at 50. 
3. See Gabriel Ahlfeldt & Elisabetta Pietrostefani, Demystifying Compact Urban 
Growth: Evidence from 300 Studies from Across the World 32 (Coalition for 
Urban Transitions, working paper, 2017), https://newclimateeconomy.report/ 
 workingpapers/workingpaper/demystifying-compact-urban-growth/ [https:// 
 perma.cc/K854-4MHJ] (reporting estimate from meta-analysis of studies 
of impact of densification on carbon emissions). See generally Stephen M. 
Wheeler et al., Carbon Footprint Planning: Quantifying Local and State 
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economic mobility.4 Yet (and here is the puzzle) Democratic 
policymakers have done very little to repurpose for dense urban 
development land that was zoned for suburban uses long ago. If one 
could watch time-lapse films of metropolitan development in “red” and 
“blue” states, one would notice some differences: more suburban sprawl 
in the red states; more protected parks and open space in the blue 
states. But the commonalities would be even more striking: since World 
War II, there has been virtually no intensification of land use in existing 
residential neighborhoods.5 
In the early-twentieth century, it was common for developers in 
booming cities to tear down existing single-family homes and replace 
them with small apartment buildings.6 Yet by the 1940s, this pattern 
was nowhere to be seen.7 The spread of zoning evidently put an end to 
it.8 In city after city, affluent homeowners prevailed upon municipal 
officials to zone out “parasitic” apartment buildings from their neigh–
borhoods.9 
 
Mitigation Opportunities for 700 California Cities, 3 Urb. Plan. 35 
(2018). 
4. See Raj Chetty et al., Where Is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography 
of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States, 129 Q.J. Econ. 1553, 
1555–56 (2014) (finding that racial and socioeconomic homogeneity is 
negatively correlated with intergenerational mobility); Arthur Acolin & 
Susan Wachter, Opportunity and Housing Access, 19 Cityscape 135, 135 
(2017) (finding that “areas[] from which lower-income households are 
increasingly priced out, [economically thriving but supply-constrained 
cities] are also more likely to have higher levels of intergenerational 
mobility.”). 
5. See Issi Romem, America’s New Metropolitan Landscape: Pockets of 
Dense Construction in a Dormant Suburban Interior, Buildzoom (Feb. 1, 
2018), https://www.buildzoom.com/blog/pockets-of-dense-construction-in-
a-dormant-suburban-interior [https://perma.cc/C9BQ-QAKT] (using 
building-permit data to chart development patterns). 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Zoning Strait-Jacket: Evidence from the 
Silicon Valley, Greater New Haven, and Greater Austin 5 (Jan. 7, 2020) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (explaining how restrictive 
zoning ordinances suppress housing production), available at https://papers 
 .ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3507803 [https://perma.cc/ZDZ9-
V8L2]. 
9. The U.S. Supreme Court characterized apartment buildings as “parasite[s]” 
in its seminal decision upholding the constitutionality of a municipality’s 
zoning power. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 
(1926) (“[V]ery often the apartment house is a mere parasite [in 
neighborhoods of detached homes], constructed in order to take advantage 
of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential 
character of the district.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020 
Auctioning the Upzone 
516 
Today, despite skyrocketing demand that has pushed the price of 
new apartments and condominiums far above the cost of construction 
in the most economically productive American metropolises,10 vast 
swaths of the cityscape remain zoned exclusively for single-family 
homes.11 Homeowners strongly resist intensifying land use in their 
neighborhoods, and they wield outsized influence in local politics by 
voting and otherwise participating at disproportionally high rates.12 
Because of this, the vision of the thriving city as an engine of socio–
 
10. See Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Economic Implications of 
Housing Supply, 32 J. Econ. Persp. 3, 13 tbl.2 (2018) (showing growth 
in share of U.S. municipalities with housing prices more than 25% greater 
than construction costs); Issi Romem, Paying for Dirt: Where Have Home 
Values Detached from Construction Costs?, Buildzoom (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://www.buildzoom.com/blog/paying-for-dirt-where-have-home-values-
detached-from-construction-costs [https://perma.cc/C3US-6JJK] (providing 
metro-area estimates of home values relative to construction costs). In a 
competitive market that is not supply-constrained, housing prices in the 
long run will be very close to construction costs. See Glaeser & Gyourko, 
supra. 
11. See, e.g., Emily Badger & Quoctrung Bui, Cities Start to Question an 
American Ideal: A House with a Yard on Every Lot, N.Y. Times (June 
18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/18/upshot/ 
 cities-across-america-question-single-family-zoning.html [https://perma.cc/ 
 5BYK-AMJH] (mapping share of land zoned for single-family homes in 
ten cities). 
12. See generally Michael Hankinson, When Do Renters Behave Like 
Homeowners? High Rent, Price Anxiety, and NIMBYism, 112 Am. Pol. 
Sci. Rev. 473 (2018) (regarding differences in land-use preferences 
between homeowners and renters); William Marble & Clayton Nall, 
Where Interests Trump Ideology: Homeownership’s Persistent Role in 
Local Housing Development Politics (Oct. 23, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with authors), available at http://www.nallresearch 
 .com/uploads/7/9/1/7/7917910/interest.3.3.pdf; Mark Baldassare et 
al., Pub. Pol’y Inst. of Cal., Californians & Their Government 
(2019), available at https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/ppic-
statewide-survey-californians-and-their-government-may-2019.pdf [https:// 
 perma.cc/5QDS-WZXM] (same). Regarding differences in political 
participation between homeowners and renters, see Andrew Hall & Jesse 
Yoder, Does Homeownership Influence Political Behavior? Evidence from 
Administrative Data (Mar. 26, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author) (reviewing literature and estimating causal effect of becoming 
a homeowner on political participation); Brian J McCabe, Are Homeowners 
Better Citizens? Homeownership and Community Participation in the 
United States, 91 Soc. Forces 929, 947–48 (2013) (finding that 
homeownership positively correlates with turnout in elections but not with 
forms of civic participation that do not affect value of home); Katherine 
L. Einstein et al., Who Participates in Local Government? Evidence from 
Meeting Minutes, 17 Persp. on Pol. 28 (2019) (studying minutes of 
planning and zoning board meetings in Boston area and finding that 
homeowners are vastly overrepresented among people who comment on 
land use issues, and nearly always speak in opposition to proposed 
developments). 
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economic mobility is increasingly a thing of the past.13 In today’s high-
cost cities, the wage premium paid to low-skilled workers no longer 
offsets the cost of rent.14 
The problem of the housing-supply-constrained city has very 
serious consequences for socioeconomic mobility, the environment, and 
national economic welfare.15 Policymakers are starting to pay attention, 
prodded by a nascent Yes In My Backyard (“YIMBY”) movement that 
is challenging incumbent homeowners’ prerogative to keep their 
neighborhoods just as they have “always” been.16 The YIMBYs have 
scored some early victories. After a public reckoning with the racist 
history of single-family zoning, the Minneapolis City Council voted in 
2018 to authorize four-unit dwellings on every lot in the city and to 
allow taller and denser buildings along transit corridors.17 The state of 
Oregon followed suit with a 2019 statute that requires larger cities to 
allow duplexes or fourplexes on all parcels zoned for residential use.18 A 
number of other states have directed local governments to allow so-
called “accessory dwelling units” in single-family neighborhoods.19 
No state, however, has made much headway getting cities to allow 
substantially larger buildings in previously low-density residential 
 
13. See generally David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of 
Residential Stagnation, 127 Yale L.J. 78 (2017); Peter Ganong & Daniel 
Shoag, Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S. Declined?, 102 
J. Urb. Econ. 76 (2017). 
14. Hankinson, supra note 12, at 2–5. 
15. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Beyond the Double Veto: Housing Plans as 
Preemptive Intergovernmental Compacts, 71 Hastings L.J. 79, 92 (2019). 
16. See generally Kenneth Stahl, “Yes in My Backyard”: Can a New Pro-
Housing Movement Overcome the Power of NIMBYs?, 41 Zoning & 
Plan. L. Rep. 1 (2018). 
17. Sarah Mervosh, Minneapolis, Tackling Housing Crisis and Inequity, Votes 
to End Single-Family Zoning, N.Y. Times (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www 
 .nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/minneapolis-single-family-zoning.html 
[https://perma.cc/8DUY-QLTM]. 
18. Laura Bliss, Oregon’s Single-Family Zoning Ban Was a ‘Long Time 
Coming’, Citylab (July 2, 2019), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/ 
 07/oregon-single-family-zoning-reform-yimby-affordable-housing/593137/ 
[https://perma.cc/8QA6-7XD9]; H.B. 2001, 80th Legis. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. § 2 (Or. 2019)(the duplex/fourplex requirement applies to cities of 
more than 10,000 or 25,000 people, respectively). 
19. See generally Elmendorf, supra note 15, at 83; John Infranca, Housing 
Changing Households: Regulatory Challenges for Micro-Units and Accessory 
Dwelling Units, 25 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 53, 68 (2014). California, 
Oregon, Washington, and New Jersey have also pushed local governments 
to rezone for somewhat greater density by establishing “default densities” 
that provide a safe harbor against certain requirements under state law. 
See Elmendorf, supra note 15, at 54 n.283. 
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neighborhoods.20 In California, state senator Scott Wiener made waves 
in 2018 and 2019 by introducing bills that would require local 
governments to permit four- to five-story buildings within one-quarter 
mile of a transit stop, but the legislature’s Democratic leadership 
deemed the idea too incendiary and doused it.21 Similar bills were also 
introduced in 2019 in Washington and Oregon, but each failed to 
receive even a favorable committee vote.22 
This Article proposes a new tool to induce high-cost cities to 
accommodate more housing: the state-supervised development-rights 
auction. Local governments that expand their zoning envelopes 
pursuant to a state-approved plan would be entitled to auction, and 
thus profit from, the newly created developable space. We argue that 
this auction model would bring about greater residential density 
through three channels. First, it would enable municipal governments 
to capture much more of the economic value created by upzoning and 
regulatory streamlining than they do today, which in turn would create 
new and better opportunities for local political entrepreneurs to 
assemble pro-development coalitions. By way of illustration, our back-
of-the-envelope calculations suggest that auction revenues have the 
 
20. See generally Romem, supra note 5. See also Issi Romem, Can U.S. Cities 
Compensate for Curbing Sprawl by Growing Denser?, Buildzoom (Sept. 14, 
2016), https://www.buildzoom.com/blog/can-cities-compensate-for-curbing-
sprawl-by-growing-denser [https://perma.cc/BEC7-X8WV] (noting that 
while state laws in Oregon and Washington have induced somewhat 
denser development than is typical of other states, “the increase in 
[Portland and Seattle’s] rate of housing production pales in comparison to 
what similarly-sized cities like Phoenix and Atlanta have achieved 
through outward expansion”); Paavo Monkkonen & Spike Friedman, 
UCLA Lewis Ctr. for Regional Pol’y Stud., Not Nearly 
Enough: California Lacks Capacity to Meet Lofty Housing 
Goals 3 (2019) (demonstrating that “zoned capacity” for new residential 
in California is strongly skewed toward less productive regions and, within 
regions, toward the exurban periphery, notwithstanding state policies 




21. See Julia Wick, Essential California: Inside the Demise of SB 50, the 
State’s Most Talked-about Bill, L.A. Times (May 17, 2019), https://www 
 .latimes.com/newsletters/la-me-ln-essential-california-20190517-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/EDD2-ZCPX] (“The bill died because it was held in 
the Senate Appropriations Committee. Essentially, this is a way that the 
Legislature can hold bills without having a formal vote, particularly sticky 
bills where they don’t want to leave fingerprints on who actually killed 
them.”). 
22. See S.B. 5769, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019); S.B. 10, 80th Legis. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019). For the Washington bill’s status, visit 
https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=5769&Year=2019&ini
tiative; for the Oregon bill’s, visit https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2019R1/ 
 Measures/Overview/SB10. 
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potential to double the size of San Francisco’s discretionary general 
fund. Second, our model would give local political actors whose policy 
preferences align with the state’s a simple tool for entrenching upzoning 
and permit-streamlining policies. Third, the model would improve state 
oversight of local land-use regulation by reducing informational 
asymmetries between the state and local governments.23 
This Article’s proposal builds on the work of economists William 
Fischel and Robert Nelson, and law professors Rick Hills and David 
Schleicher. A generation ago, Fischel and Nelson concluded that local 
governments should have more or less unfettered discretion to sell 
rezoning for cash.24 More recently, Hills and Schleicher have argued that 
so-called “transferable development rights” programs can be used to 
redistribute among landowners upzoning’s economic gains, shifting 
value toward more politically popular landowners and thereby gener–
ating public support for otherwise tough-to-sell rezonings.25 
 
23. We are not the only scholars to have conceived of development-rights 
auctions. After we published a white paper laying out the idea, a reader 
referred us to a couple of studies in Brazil of development-rights auctions, 
see infra note 92, and to a proposal from the Canadian economist Tom 
Davidoff for development-rights auctions in Vancouver and Toronto. 
Thomas Davidoff, Redevelopment Auctions (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with authors). Professor Vicki Been has also suggested in passing that 
an “auction scheme[]” of some sort might improve on existing programs 
for awarding density bonuses to developers who contribute public-
improvement funds. See N.Y.U. Furman Ctr. for Real Estate & Urb. 
Pol’y, Buying Sky: The Market for Transferable Development 
Rights in New York City 18 (2013), available at https://furmancenter.org/ 
 files/BuyingSky_PolicyBrief_21OCT2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/QD7A-
A676]. As best we can tell, however, we are the first to argue for 
development-rights auctions not only as a means of value capture, but 
also as a device for enabling local pro-housing factions to entrench their 
policy preferences, and as a device for rectifying informational asymmetries 
between state oversight agencies and local governments. 
24. Nelson envisioned groups of homeowners banding together with the help 
of a local government to collectively sell their parcels for redevelopment. 
See Robert H. Nelson, Zoning and Property Rights: An Analysis 
of the American System of Land-Use Regulation 178–81 (1977). 
Fischel, observing that rezoning decisions often instantiate de facto 
bargains between a developer, neighborhood groups, and the local 
government, sought to facilitate efficient bargains by introducing the 
efficient medium of exchange: money. See William A. Fischel, The 
Economics of Zoning Laws: A Property Rights Approach to 
American Land Use Controls 75–101 (1985) (suggesting some fetters, 
principally that local governments should not be allowed to sell the right 
to develop certain “normal” land uses). 
25. Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Building Coalitions Out of 
Thin Air: Transferable Development Rights and “Constituency Effects” 
in Land Use Law, 12 J. Leg. Analysis, 79 (2020); Roderick M. Hills, Jr. 
& David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 91, 
125–27 (2015). 
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The common thread running through these scholars’ work is the 
notion that if local governments could capture or strategically redist–
ribute more of upzoning’s economic gains, they would allow more 
efficient upzoning to occur. This Article starts with the same idea, while 
contributing a new mode of value-capture (auctions), and a couple of 
new layers to the argument: one about asymmetric entrenchment of 
land-use policies; the other about informational barriers to effective 
state superintendence of local regulation. 
Part I sets the stage by explaining the cumbersome methods local 
governments now use to extract value from new residential develop–
ment. These methods either destroy or fail to collect a good part of the 
value that upzoning ought to create. Part II introduces the proposal. It 
explains the logic of value capture through auctions (relative to present-
day alternatives), as well as our rationale for conditioning the local right 
to auction development allowances on a state agency’s approval of the 
plan. Part III discusses the likely effects of our proposal on the local 
political economy of land-use regulation, and on the monitoring 
capacity of state agencies charged with overseeing local plans. Part IV 
responds to objections. The final Part concludes.26 
I. Value Capture, Done Badly 
A. The Transformation of Zoning: From Nuisance Prevention to Tacit 
Value Capture 
The original theory of zoning presupposed that land uses should be 
separated so that noisome industrial and commercial activities would 
not interfere with peaceable residential living. Zoning was envisioned as 
a clear-cut, ex-ante substitute for the unpredictable common law of 
nuisance.27 Projects conforming to objective requirements—use, height, 
bulk, setbacks, etc.—would be permitted “as of right.” The actual 
practice of zoning today bears little resemblance to the theory. 
Especially in high-cost housing markets, development permitting has 
become thoroughly discretionary, often requiring project-by-project 
negotiations over design, scale, public benefits, affordable-housing set 
asides, and so much more.28 What happened? 
 
26. One note before proceeding: to keep this Article reasonably short and to 
the point, we have omitted the usual literature review about the serious 
social costs of urban housing-supply restrictions and the obduracy of low-
density residential zones. We have cited some of the relevant literature in 
this Introduction, see supra notes 5–15, and readers who want a more 
extensive review are referred to other work. E.g., Elmendorf, supra note 
15, at 86–94 (reviewing literature). 
27. See Robert C. Ellickson & A. Dan Tarlock, Land Use Controls: 
Cases and Materials 57–60 (3rd ed. 1981). 
28. For an in-depth look at current development-permitting practices in 
California, see generally Moira O’Neill et al., Developing Policy from the 
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The original theory of zoning was badly eroded by two 
developments in the 1970s.29 Home equity, particularly in coastal cities, 
began to rise faster than the general level of inflation, and property-tax 
bills went up, too.30 This contributed to tax revolts such as California’s 
infamous Proposition 13, which dramatically cut property taxes and 
strictly limited their future growth. Because property taxes were the 
traditional source of local government revenue31—and voters apparently 
did not want dramatic cuts to local services—local officials started 
looking for other revenue streams. Requiring new development to “pay 
its own way” was both politically appealing and theoretically reason–
able. 
Under the old pre-Proposition 13 regime, it was expected that new 
residential development would support the cost of associated infra–
structure through property taxes paid over time. Proposition 13 (and 
similar measures in other states) called this assumption into doubt. 
Because new development could no longer be counted on to pay for 
itself after the fact, it needed to do so beforehand. “Flexible” zoning 
got the job done.32 By establishing discretionary-development regimes, 
local officials could condition a project’s approval on the developer’s 
provision of public infrastructure, parks, funding for schools, or 
whatever else officialdom prioritized at the time.33 
 
Ground Up: Examining Entitlement in the Bay Area to Inform California’s 
Housing Policy Debates, 25 Hastings Envtl. L.J. 1 (2019). 
29. Other forces, long at work, also contributed to the erosion, such as 
planners’ lack of foresight about where development would be most 
valuable, and in what form. See Ellickson & Tarlock, supra note 27, 
at 75–79 (reviewing literature that challenges the supposition that 
planners can foresee where housing-stock growth would be valuable). 
30. See William A. Fischel, Zoning Rules!: The Economics of Land 
Use Regulation 212–15 (2015). In an inflationary environment, the 
nominal rise in prices translates to a real gain for homeowners who have 
a fixed-rate mortgage. Moreover, as Fischel explains, because the nominal 
increase in most other investments’ values was subject to capital-gains 
taxation, owner-occupied homes became uniquely attractive investments 
during the 1970s inflationary period (owing to a capital-gains exclusion). 
Id. at 212–13. 
31. See Richard A. Musgrave, The Tax Revolt, 59 Soc. Sci. Q. 697, 697–98 
(1979). 
32. See Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use 
Regulation, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 601 (2010); Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, 
Introduction: Exclusionary Land-Use Regulations, 41 Urb. Stud. 225, 
257 (2004). 
33. See, e.g., Marla Dresch & Steven M. Sheffrin, Who Pays for 
Development Fees and Exactions? 25–28 (1997) (recounting history 
and analyzing incidence of exactions). 
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The other source of pressure on the traditional model of zoning was 
homeowner activism.34 As Fischel has argued, inflation and a rise in 
home equity during the 1970s made homeowners ever more concerned 
about protecting their homes’ values, which for most was their largest 
asset.35 Discretionary-permitting regimes, sometimes coupled with 
neighborhood-level review boards, gave homeowners a chance to shape 
and customize each potential project in their neighborhood. By fettering 
new development with ad hoc conditions and limitations, homeowners 
could protect their views, maintain open spaces, ensure architectural-
style compatibility, and keep poor people out of their communities. All 
of this reduced the likelihood of an adverse shock to home values in the 
neighborhood. 
No device better exemplifies the 1970s’ transformation of land-use 
regulation than the “development agreement.”36 This is a contract 
whereby a local government agrees to allow certain forms and densities 
of development on identified parcels in the future, in return for the 
developer providing specified benefits to the city.37 
Development agreements positioned local elected officials to 
balance their city’s fiscal needs against the demands of neighbors and 
interest groups. By zoning for much less housing than market conditions 
warranted, or by threatening to downzone specific parcels on which a 
project had been proposed, local governments could push developers to 
propose a deal. Proposal in hand, officials could take the pulse of 
neighbors, and then either quash the project or demand a better deal. 
 
34. See Fischel, supra note 30, at 205–12. 
35. See id. at 214–15. 
36. See generally David L. Callies et al., Development by Agreement: 
A Tool Kit for Land Developers and Local Governments 2–3, 
15–36 (2012); Arden H. Rathkopf et al., Rathkopf’s The Law of 
Zoning and Planning § 44:1 (Sarah C. Bronin & Dwight H. Merriam 
eds., 4th ed. 2019). Development agreements emerged after courts held 
that local governments have essentially unlimited discretion to change the 
zoning and development regulations applicable to a given site long after 
the developer has submitted her project application. For example, the 
California Supreme Court ruled in 1976 that developer who had spent 
millions of dollars preparing a site and putting in roads and utilities, all 
with proper permits, had no vested right to complete her project under 
the rules in place at the time she submitted her application. AVCO Cmty. 
Developers, Inc. v. S. Coast Reg’l Comm’n., 553 P.2d 546, 549–50, 554 
(Cal. 1976). The only way the developer could protect herself against 
possibly calamitous regulatory changes was to bind the city with a 
contract. Though many courts had held that local governments could not 
limit their future regulatory power by contract, the California legislature 
in 1979 expressly authorized such limitation through development 
agreements, see Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 65864–65 (1984), and courts and 
legislatures in other states followed suit. 
37. Callies et al., supra note 36, at 15–22. 
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Development agreements are but one example of the numerous 
devices that local governments utilize as a condition of project approval 
to extract resources from developers.38 Broadly speaking, we can 
categorize these devices by the medium of exchange (cash versus in-
kind benefits), and the rigidity of the local government’s demand (a 
fixed schedule versus case-by-case negotiation). No public demand is 
inexorably fixed, but there is a big difference between legislated 
requirements that govern all projects until changed through the 
legislative process, and exactions negotiated case-by-case for each 
project. Table 1 provides examples in each category. 
Table 1. Typology of Value Capture Devices 
 Fixed Schedule Case-by-Case 
Negotiation 
Money Impact fees (which may finance 
roads, sewers, schools, parks, 
transportation, public art, or any 
other service that the local 
government provides, at least in 
part, to service the development) 
Development 
agreements; ad 














Inclusionary zoning and its near cousin, the density-bonus or 
“incentive-zoning” ordinance, have emerged as particularly important 
examples of the fixed-schedule/in-kind-benefits quadrant.39 Inclusionary 
 
38. For a comprehensive review, see Selmi, supra note 32, at 597, 602–03. 
39. See David L. Callies & Derek B. Simon, Fair Housing, Discrimination 
and Inclusionary Zoning in the United States, 4 J. Int’l & Comp. L. 39, 
65–66 (2017); Brian Stromberg & Lisa Sturtevant, What Makes 
Inclusionary Zoning Happen? 1–4 (2016), available at http://landuselaw 
 .wustl.edu/Articles/Inclusionary%20Zoning%20Rept%202016.pdf [https:// 
 perma.cc/JC6F-RUT].   
 All of the recent state-level and citywide upzoning proposals with which 
we are familiar have affordable-housing conditions. For example, 
California now has a statewide density bonus statute that allows developers 
to build a story higher than the applicable zoning (and demand other 
concessions) if the developer meets certain affordability targets. See Jon 
Goetz & Tom Sakai, MeyersNave, Guide to the California Density 
Bonus Law 3, 5, 8 (2020), available at https://www.meyersnave.com/wp-
content/uploads/California-Density-Bonus-Law.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
 EPL4-7QZE]. Prominent citywide upzonings in Seattle, Austin, and 
Minneapolis all featured affordable-housing conditions. See Daniel 
Beekman, Seattle Upzones 27 Neighborhood Hubs, Passes Affordable-
Housing Requirements, Seattle Times (Mar. 18, 2019, 4:30 PM), 
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zoning requires developers of market-rate projects to set aside a 
designated fraction of the units as price-restricted housing for low- or 
moderate-income households. Density-bonus ordinances relax other–
wise-applicable density, size, parking, and other restrictions in exchange 
for additional price-restricted units.40 Some local governments also use 
density bonuses to reward environmentally exceptional projects or 
projects with other public benefits.41 
B. “Public Benefit Zoning”: Value Capture Becomes Explicit 
Zoning’s transformation into a tool of value extraction was not 
without controversy. Early on, a few state courts harshly criticized and 
tried to shut down the overt exchange of rezoning for money.42 In 1987, 
the U.S. Supreme Court stepped in, holding that the Takings Clause 
requires a qualitative “nexus” between any property exaction that a 
government demands as a condition of project approval and the 
project’s identifiable harms or infrastructure needs.43 A local govern–
ment may not, for example, demand a public right of beach access 
through a landowner’s property if the proposed development would 
merely impinge on public views, rather than encroach on public rights 




 perma.cc/YK2X-NVRY]; Ryan Thornton, Council Passes Affordable 
Housing Density Bonus Program, Austin Monitor (May 10, 2019), 
https://www.austinmonitor.com/stories/2019/05/council-passes-affordable-
housing-density-bonus-program/ [https://perma.cc/LB9N-HES9]; Amended 
and Restated Unified Housing Policy of the City of Minneapolis, 
Community Planning & Economic Development (Dec. 7, 2018), http:// 
 www.minneapolismn.gov/cped/housing/cped_affordable_housing_resolution 
[https://perma.cc/C479-54ZZ]. A 2017 California statute that streamlines 
permits for certain projects in jurisdictions that have failed to meet state 
housing goals requires qualifying projects to include a percentage of below-
market-rate (BMR) units. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 65400 (2017). And 
the upzoning-near-transit bills recently debated in California and 
Washington would similarly have required qualifying projects to satisfy 
BMR-share conditions. See supra notes 23–24. 
40. See, e.g., Goetz & Sakai, supra note 39, at 3–6 (summarizing concessions 
available under state density-bonus law). 
41. E.g., Seattle, Wash., Municipal Code § 23.41.004 (2020). 
42. See, e.g., Mun. Art Soc’y v. City of New York, 522 N.Y.S.2d 800, 803–04 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (reversing the city’s sale of site to a developer 
because developer was promised a $57 million price reduction if the city 
did not provide a zoning bonus); Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: 
New Rules for an Old Game: Comments on the Municipal Art Society 
and Nollan Cases, 39 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 3, 12–13, 37 
(1991). 
43. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
44. See id. at 838–39. 
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be grossly disproportional in magnitude to the project’s reasonably 
foreseeable harms or infrastructure needs.45 The most recent Supreme 
Court decision in this lineage extended in-kind exactions’ nexus-and-
proportionality requirement to monetary fees.46 
The economist William Fischel was an early critic of this juris–
prudence.47 He argued that the nexus requirement just made land-use 
bargains less efficient. It pushed local governments to barter with 
developers, negotiating in-kind exactions when a cash transfer would 
have been cheaper for the developer and more valuable to the local 
government. The nexus-and-proportionality requirement also made 
local governments waste time and money on pointless justificatory 
studies, studies that any consultant worth her salt would reverse-
engineer to reach whatever conclusion about “impacts” served her 
client’s interests. 
Fischel urged local governments and their judicial and legislative 
overseers to abandon the pretense of rational planning in the public 
interest. Developers have better information than public officials about 
what prospective homeowners and tenants actually want, and about 
how to provide those forms of housing at the lowest cost, so developers 
rather than planners and politicians should initiate rezonings. To 
facilitate rezoning, courts ought to let local governments put whatever 
price and other conditions they want on development permits, at least 
if the permits would allow developers to build at more than the 
“normal” (median) density of developed parcels in the jurisdiction. 
Fischel’s plea did not move the federal courts: The nexus 
requirement remains the law of the land. Yet the actual practice of 
urban land-use regulation today bears more than a passing resemblance 
to what Fischel envisioned a generation ago. Sophisticated local 
governments make no effort to conceal their value-extraction 
ambitions.48 A cottage industry of consultants has sprung into action, 
 
45. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (“We think a term such 
as ‘rough proportionality’ best encapsulates what we hold to be the 
requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical 
calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized 
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and 
extent to the impact of the proposed development.”) (emphasis added). 
46. Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 599 (2013). 
47. This paragraph summarizes Fischel’s thinking on the topic in 1985. See 
supra note 24, at 75–101. For his latest approach, see Fischel, supra note 
30. 
48. For example, many city officials in California said that they opposed the 
recent statewide upzoning bills because the bills would deprive cities of 
their ability to condition rezoning so as to capture the value conferred by 
the rezoning. See, e.g., Joe Fitzgerald Rodriguez, SF Lawmaker Threatens 
to Sue State if Transit-Oriented Development Bill Passes, S.F. Examiner 
(Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.sfexaminer.com/news/sf-lawmaker-threatens-
to-sue-state-if-transit-oriented-development-bill-passes/mggallery/image/ 
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helping local governments that are open to some form of upzoning get 
the most buck for their bang49 The consultants’ mantra is simple: “No 
densities without amenities.”50 Rezoning for more development should 
never occur “until Public Benefit Zoning policies are established.”51 And 
what, precisely, is a “public-benefit zoning policy”? To quote a leading 
practitioner, it is an “explicit[] attempt[] to recapture land value 
increases”52 in the form of impact fees, affordable housing units, land 
dedications, and other “community benefits.”53 
The linchpin of public-benefit zoning is the “residual land value 
analysis.”54 A consultant evaluates development possibilities for parcels 
that may be rezoned, estimating total development costs and likely 
developer revenues under several rezoning scenarios. The difference (the 
residual) is “what the developer can pay for land and still make a 
profit.”55 The local government uses the estimated residual to 
“determine the level of required community benefits from a new 
development, while at the same time maintaining the development’s 
financial feasibility.”56 The idea is to set community-benefit demands 
at a level that makes development or redevelopment of a parcel just 
slightly more profitable than the parcel’s next most remunerative use. 
Of course, none of this tracks with the notion that fees and 
exactions may only be used to recover costs that a development imposes 
on the public. But no matter. More consultants are called into service 
to gin up nexus studies premised on every imaginable cost-inflating 
assumption.57 Treating those studies’ results as a legally defensible 
 
 sf-sb827001/ [https://perma.cc/8J97-V9F4] (reporting on San Francisco 
Board of Supervisors’ resolutions to oppose the statewide upzoning bill). 
49. For examples of their handiwork, see, e.g., Dyett & Bhatia, Redwood 
City Community Benefits Program, Community Benefits 
Program Brief (2014), available at http://www.redwoodcity.org/Home/ 
 ShowDocument?id=4180 [https://perma.cc/GC8U-F954]; Nico Calavita 
& Marian Wolfe, White Paper on the Theory, Economics and 
Practice of Public Benefit Zoning (2014), available at http://ebho. 
 org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/LVR-White-Paper-ExecSum_141113 
 .compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/H794-PHMF]. 
50. Calavita & Wolfe, supra note 49, at iv. 
51. Id. at ix. 
52. Id. (emphasis added). 
53. Id. at 11–12. 
54. Id. at 5. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Cf. Geoffrey L. Robinson & Christopher A. Chou, Do Post-
Palmer and Patterson Residential Nexus Studies Satisfy 
Applicable Constitutional and Statutory Requirements? (2014) 
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upper bound, the local government then adopts a tiered impact-fee 
ordinance, with lower per-housing-unit or per-square-foot fees applied 
to parcels where building in the expanded zoning envelope would be 
relatively costly compared to the market value of the finished units.58 
To illustrate, imagine a neighborhood in which all parcels have 
traditionally been zoned for buildings up to forty feet tall. A 
contemplated rezoning would allow one-hundred-foot buildings near 
two major intersections, fifty-foot buildings along certain corridors, and 
otherwise leave the forty-foot cap in place. Concurrent with the 
rezoning, the local government enacts a three-tier impact fee, with one 
rate set at the level that would recover the estimated residual for 
projects that build to one-hundred feet, another rate set to recover the 
estimated residual for fifty-foot buildings, and still another to recover 
the residual for forty-foot buildings. This is the state of the art today, 
exemplified by recent upzonings in San Francisco and Santa Monica.59 
If the nexus study does not support a fee schedule that would 
recover the full residual, the local government can always supplement 
impact fees with other community-benefit demands, such as requiring 
developers of high-value sites to set aside more units as affordable 
housing, to pay union wages, to install public art, to plant gardens and 
street trees, or to do pretty much anything else that the local 
government might want. The lower federal and state courts have 
facilitated this in various ways, such as by categorizing inclusionary 
zoning as an ordinary commercial regulation, exempt from the 
heightened scrutiny accorded to property exactions and fees.60 
C. A Critique of Contemporary Value Capture 
Though local governments have embraced the “public-benefit 
zoning” theory, there remain serious problems with its practice. Cities 
today have three basic tools for recapturing upzoning’s value: legislated 
schedules of fees, legislated schedules of in-kind benefits, and ad-hoc 
exchanges (see Table 1). None of these tools does value capture very 
well. 
To see the difficulties, consider the best-case scenario: a legislated 
impact-fee schedule that is perfectly calibrated to extract the land-value 
residual from every parcel, tantamount to a special assessment on 
upzoning.61 The fee per square foot of new construction is very high on 
 
(critiquing methods used in nexus studies for affordable-housing impact 
fees). 
58. Calavita & Wolfe, supra note 49, at vii–viii. 
59. Id. at 19–29. 
60. See, e.g., Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 978–
79 (Cal. 2015). 
61. States that authorize special assessments typically require them to be used 
for recapturing the benefit provided by a specific piece of infrastructure 
rather than a change in zoning. There are a few examples from other 
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parcels that are large, flat, vacant, and well-located. It is smaller on 
parcels that are awkwardly shaped, already in use, and those that would 
otherwise be expensive to redevelop. The fee, being perfectly calibrated, 
reduces the land-value residual on every parcel to just above zero. Each 
parcel that would have been profitable to develop or redevelop absent 
the fee is just barely profitable to develop with the fee in place. 
Now imagine that the President imposes a tariff on steel, or that 
an immigration crackdown dries up the supply of low-wage labor. 
Suddenly the cost of construction is much higher than the residual-
land-value analysis had anticipated, and the actual residual is 
negative.62 New development will grind to a halt unless the fees are 
reduced.63 
For the same reason, a fee schedule calibrated for value capture will 
increase the returns to NIMBY activism. Once such a schedule is in 
place, any modest, across-the-board increase in the cost of development 
will make the land-value residual negative everywhere in the juris–
diction, bringing development to a screeching halt. All it would take is 
(say) a ballot measure that either modestly increases the city’s 
inclusionary-zoning requirement, imposes a somewhat costly set of 
environmental standards, or gives neighbors of proposed projects new 
procedural rights that can be used for delay. By contrast, in the absence 
of the fee schedule, a ballot initiative that modestly increases develop–
ment costs across the board would kill development only on the hardest-
to-develop sites. Elsewhere the land-value residual would remain 
positive. 
Of course, real-world fee schedules are not perfectly calibrated to 
extract 99% of the residual on every parcel included in a rezoning. Yet 
the imperfections may not make the fee schedule any more conducive 
to efficient land use. Under a lumpy, imperfectly calibrated schedule, 
the required fee is bound to exceed the land-value residual on some, 
 
countries of special assessments on upzonings. See infra notes 192–195 
and accompanying text. 
62. We are using “negative” here a bit loosely, to refer to a residual that is 
smaller in expectation than the residual that would be necessary for the 
developer to earn a normal, risk-adjusted rate of return. 
63. Cf. J.K. Dineen, SF Residential Projects Languish as Rising Costs Force 
Developers to Cash Out, S.F. Chronicle (Aug. 27, 2018), https:// 
 www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/SF-residential-projects-languish-as-
rising-costs-13183841.php [https://perma.cc/TMV3-WGMP] (reporting that 
10% to 15% annual increases in construction costs over five-year period 
made many already-entitled residential projects no longer profitable to 
build, given fee and exaction schedule, notwithstanding San Francisco’s 
sky-high housing prices). 
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perhaps many, sites. Indeed, if neighborhood NIMBYs had a hand in 
its development, the fee may have this effect by design.64 
No real-world fee schedule is entirely rigid. If a trade shock, 
economic downturn, or NIMBY win turns the land-value residual 
negative on a big swath of parcels, the city council may revisit and 
relax the fees. But negotiations to revise the schedule will be difficult. 
Developers, for competitive reasons, will not want to reveal their actual 
cost structures. NIMBYs will lobby to keep the fees high, probably 
hiding behind a professed concern for affordable housing or the 
environment. Other pressing matters may compete for the legislative 
body’s time and attention. Time that should be spent debating where 
new housing should go will instead be consumed fighting about the level 
of the fees. 
To do value capture with legislated impact fees is to either embark 
on a never-ending, always-contentious project of fee-schedule 
adjustment, commit to high fees that end up deterring development on 
many sites, or to lowball the fees and leave most of the value conferred 
by upzoning uncaptured. 
What is the alternative? Well, a city can always do value extraction 
using a fixed schedule of in-kind benefits such as affordable-housing 
units. But this is even worse. It carries forward the principal vice of 
impact fees—the setting of rigid “prices,” which will deter the 
development of marginal sites and reward NIMBY activism—while 
abandoning the fees’ principal virtue, an efficient medium of exchange. 
As Fischel observed long ago, in-kind benefits are generally worth less 
than their cash equivalent to local governments.65 This of course raises 
the question of why local governments ever choose the in-kind 
alternative. One reason is that it allows local governments to end-run 
certain legal limitations on the size of fees.66 
The remaining mode of value capture is the negotiated, ad hoc deal, 
hashed out between the developer and the planning agency or city 
council. Fischel rightly emphasized that this mode has certain 
advantages, particularly if cash is the medium of exchange.67 Most 
significantly, the ad hoc approach reduces demands on planners’ 
foresight. Developers (who know the market better) make the initial 
 
64. A high fee may deter redevelopment of smaller parcels with existing homes 
(where the land-assembly, demolition, and opportunity cost of redevelopment 
would be substantial), while still allowing development on large vacant 
sites—which are unlikely to be found in residential neighborhoods. 
65. See supra Part I.C. 
66. See, e.g., Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 979 
(Cal. 2015) (holding inclusionary zoning to be an ordinary exercise of the 
police power, not subject to constitutional limitations on exactions and 
fees); see also Part IV.F (exploring the question of whether local 
politicians sometimes prefer in-kind exactions). 
67. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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proposal about what should be built where, and the government 
decisionmaker needs to decide only whether a developer’s cash proposal 
is sufficient to pay off the project’s opponents or otherwise make the 
project worthwhile. Moreover, because the development price is 
negotiated case-by-case, it can be adjusted in response to construction-
cost shocks, NIMBY activism, parcel-specific characteristics, or 
anything else that affects the land-value residual associated with a given 
project at a given time. 
Yet as Hills and Schleicher have argued, the case-by-case modality 
of rezoning and development permitting has two very significant 
downsides.68 First, as a matter of political economy, project-specific 
decision-making tends to mobilize nearby homeowners and neigh–
borhood interest groups, who have a lot at stake in each such decision.69 
Homeowners and neighborhood groups generally oppose local inten–
sification of land use, so any decision-making procedure that mobilizes 
their participation will tend to result in land-use stasis rather than an 
increase in density. By contrast, if rezoning is done on a citywide basis, 
business and municipal-labor interests—groups that would benefit from 
lower housing prices and a bigger tax base—will mobilize. It is not 
worth their while to lobby extensively on behalf of individual projects, 
because no one project will greatly affect the city-wide tax base or the 
regional housing prices.70 
Second, while discretionary, project-specific decision-making may 
reduce informational burdens on planners, it creates huge informational 
costs for developers.71 A developer has to figure out who the relevant 
decision-makers are in each neighborhood—not only which public 
officials are nominally in charge, but also which interest groups have 
clout—and then learn what they want and what their reservation price 
is to consent to a rezoning. Interest groups will hold their cards tight 
to their vests in the hopes of getting better offers from developers. The 
developers who fare best in this game are likely to be local actors with 
deep local networks and intimate knowledge of city politics. Yet the 
most cost-effective developers are big, publicly traded homebuilders,72 
which mass produce single-family housing on exurban, lightly regulated 
“greenfields.” In California today, the cost of cookie-cutter greenfield 
 
68. See Hills & Schleicher, supra note 25, at 111–12. 
69. Id. at 112–13. 
70. Id. at 112–15. 
71. Id. at 116–20. 
72. Housing for LA, 25 Solutions From A Builder’s Perspective To Fix The 
California Housing Crisis, Urbanize L.A. (Jan. 10, 2018, 12:00 PM), 
https://urbanize.la/post/25-solutions-builder%E2%80%99s-perspective-
fix-california-housing-crisis [https://perma.cc/8VHL-FC35] (reporting that 
national builders “can construct housing for around 15-to-30 percent 
cheaper” than local builders). 
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development is roughly one-fifth that of customized infill development.73 
Although some of this difference probably reflects reasonable building-
code requirements and unavoidable site conditions, it is surely the case 
that competition, economies of scale, and transaction-cost savings 
would reduce the cost of urban infill development if the law created 
simple, standardized rights to build simple, standardized apartment 
and condo buildings in cities. 
The public administrative costs of case-by-case value extraction 
should not be overlooked. Santa Monica’s recent experience is ill–
ustrative.74 The city has a long tradition of using ad hoc development 
agreements, but local officials decided in the 2000s that they needed to 
provide a little more guidance. To this end, the city adopted a general 
plan that designates several areas near transit for greater density, 
inviting developers to choose among three tiers of additional height and 
floor-to-area ratio (“FAR”). Developers that pick Tier 1 get a modest 
three- to seven-foot height increase above base zoning in return for 
providing affordable housing on site. Those that choose Tier 2 or Tier 
3 were allowed more height and FAR in exchange for community 
benefits. The original plan provided that if a developer elected Tier 2 
or 3, the developer and the city would each prepare a residual-value 
analysis for the site. After reconciling their value estimates, the 
developer and planning officials were to negotiate a community benefits 
package and memorialize the deal in a development agreement ratified 
by the city council. It all sounded great in theory, but the city was soon 
overwhelmed by the logistics of haggling over dozens of development 
agreements.75 The city council ultimately decided to make Tier 2 height 
and FAR available in return for a standardized package of price-
restricted units and fees, reserving ad hoc deal-making for larger Tier 3 
projects.76 
To sum up: value capture is now central to the practice of municipal 
land-use regulation, but the available tools to do it have serious 
downsides. Legislated-fee and in-kind-benefit schedules are likely to 
 
73. Jacques Bughin et al., McKinsey Global Inst., A Tool Kit to 
Close California’s Housing Gap: 3.5 Million Homes by 2025, at 




74. See Calavita & Wolfe, supra note 49, at 27–29. 
75. See City of Santa Monica, Planning Commission Report 2 (Apr. 
3, 2013), https://www.smgov.net/departments/pcd/agendas/planning-
commission/2013/20130403/s2013040309b.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QRJ-
SYV5] (arguing for administrative “simplicity” over “flexibility” with 
respect to Tier 2 projects). 
76. For background, see Calavita & Wolfe, supra note 49, at 28–29. For 
the current schedule, see Santa Monica, Cal., Zoning Ordinance 
§ 9.23.010 (2017). 
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deter development of marginal sites while incentivizing NIMBY 
activism. The closer the schedule comes to realizing the value-capture 
ideal, the more brittle the city’s development regime will become, 
vulnerable to external shocks and home-grown NIMBY wins alike. The 
ad hoc alternative is more resilient, but it creates enormous inform–
ational costs for developers and administrative costs for cities. Needless 
to say, the ad hoc approach is also highly conducive to corruption, a 
further drag on the public’s tolerance for development.77 
II. The Auction Model 
We propose a regime for rezoning with value capture that combines 
the informational and administrative advantages of the citywide, 
schedule-of-fees modality, with the resiliency of piecemeal negotiated 
deals. In fact, we think our approach will prove easier to administer 
than a legislated schedule of fees, while also doing a better job than 
case-by-case deal-making of accommodating changes in the cost of 
development. Relative to the legislated-schedule approach, our model 
obviates the need for nexus studies and for updating the schedule in 
response to changed conditions. Relative to ad hoc deal-making, our 
approach eliminates project-specific research and haggling over what a 
particular developer can afford to pay, as well as over how to divide a 
developer’s “community benefits” contribution among the many 
interest groups that want a piece of it. 
Our proposal is to do value capture with auctions. Local 
governments would decide which parcels to upzone (consistent with 
state policy), while bidders at the auction and participants in the after-
auction market would price the right to build in the upzoned area. 
Proceeds from the auction would be dedicated to whatever projects or 
causes must be funded in order to assemble a political coalition ex ante 
for the upzoning. 
A. A Sketch of the Model 
Under the model we envision, state legislatures would authorize 
local governments that upzone in furtherance of state policy to apply 
to a state agency, such as California’s Department of Housing and 
Community Development, for permission to auction the newly created 
development rights. Winning bidders would acquire tradeable dev–
elopment allowances, roughly analogous to the emissions allowances 
that are now bought and sold under California’s cap-and-trade regime 
 
77. See Michael Manville & Taner Osman, Motivations for Growth Revolts: 
Discretion and Pretext as Sources of Development Conflict, 16 City & 
Community 66, 76–77 (2017) (arguing, based on case studies, that anti-
growth ballot measures are often driven by perceptions of corrupt 
relationships between local elected officials and developers). 
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for greenhouse gas emissions78 or the transferable quotas used to assign 
rights to fisheries.79 
A developer applying to build within the expanded zoning envelope 
would have to acquire and redeem allowances. The number of 
allowances would be determined by the size of her project relative to 
the “development baseline.” For example, if the developer could have 
built 5,000 square feet under the baseline but the site has been upzoned 
for 40,000 square feet, and the developer proposes 38,000 square feet, 
the developer would have to redeem allowances for 33,000 square feet. 
To protect landowners’ reasonable expectations, the state legis–
lature should carefully bound the development baseline, rather than 
leaving it entirely to local governments’ discretion. As Ellickson and 
Fischel have argued, landowners should not have to pay for the privilege 
of building something similar to what others have already built.80 
Longstanding zoning classifications also shape expectations. 
Accordingly, we recommend defining the baseline as the greater of: (1) 
the number of square feet that could have been built on the parcel 
under the zoning map and overlays in effect on the date of the state 
statute authorizing the auctions; or (2) the median floor-to-area ratio 
(building size divided by lot size) of parcels that had already been 
developed for housing within the local government’s territory as of that 
date. 
The number of allowances created by an upzoning would depend 
on the government’s estimate of the total number of buildable square 
feet post-upzoning, and the corresponding number under the 
development baseline. For example, if a total of 2,000,000 square feet 
may be built after rezoning, but only 500,000 square feet could have 
been developed under the baseline, allowances for up to 1,500,000 
square feet would be auctioned. (Whether these allowances should be 
time-limited is an important question.81) 
To maximize auction revenues, local governments would delimit 
market zones or tiers within which the right to build additional housing 
units is of roughly equal value. Development allowances would be 
fungible within, but not across, these tiers. A developer who seeks to 
build in downtown San Francisco, for example, would have to redeem 
“city center” development allowances, rather than the presumably 
 
78. See Air Res. Bd., Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, ARB Emissions 
Trading Program (2015), https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/ 
 guidance/cap_trade_overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KNK-AFD7]. 
79. See Anna M. Birkenbach et al., Taking Stock of Catch Shares: Lessons 
from the Past and Directions for the Future, 13 Rev. of Envtl. Econ. 
& Pol’y 139 (2019). 
80. Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal 
Analysis, 86 Yale L.J. 385, 418–24 (1977); William A. Fischel, 
Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics (1995). 
81. See infra Part III.B. 
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much cheaper allowances for building in outlying areas. A local 
government’s assignment of land parcels to tiers could also account for 
existing uses. A parcel with a three-story building that has been 
upzoned to allow five stories might be worth redeveloping if housing 
prices were very high, but probably only if the price of the necessary 
allowances was modest, as the cost of reengineering or tearing down the 
existing structure would be substantial. 
Assigning parcels to development-allowance tiers will be second 
nature for local governments that are already engaged in public-benefit 
zoning.82 The underlying logic is the same as assigning upzoned parcels 
to impact-fee tiers based on location-specific differences in the private 
costs and benefits of development. But a city doing value capture with 
auctions need not figure out each parcel’s exact residual. A rough 
ordering of parcels by the difference between redevelopment costs and 
expected project revenue would suffice.83 
Our upzoning-with-auctions model bears a family resemblance to 
existing transferable-development-rights (TDR) programs.84 Under a 
TDR program, the zoning authority designates separate “sending” and 
“receiving” zones, and gives landowners in the sending zone tradeable 
development credits, which are usable only by landowners in the 
receiving zone.85 Receiving-zone landowners who purchase these chits 
are allowed to build in excess of the otherwise-permitted density on 
their sites. TDR programs are, in effect, a way to redistribute among 
landowners the value created by selective upzoning.86 The auction 
 
82. See supra Part I.B. 
83. The reason the local government would not need to know the exact 
residual is that the allowance market rather than the government would 
set the price of the right to build. The reason the local government would 
want an approximate ranking of parcels by the residual is that, in a 
competitive market, the price of development allowances (like the price of 
any other good) will be determined by the marginal buyers and sellers—
those which value the allowances the least. If a significant number of low-
residual sites were included in a mostly high-residual tier, the price of 
allowances would fail to reflect the value conferred by upzoning on the 
high-residual sites. 
84. See generally Rick Pruetz, Saved by Development: Preserving 
Environmental Areas, Farmland and Historic Landmarks with 
Transfer of Development Rights 14–17 (1997) (identifying over 100 
TDR programs then in effect in the U.S.). 
85. See John J. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory 
Essay, 83 Yale L.J. 75, 86–87 (1973). 
86. See Hills, Jr. & Schleicher, supra note 25, at 125–27; cf. Vicki Been & 
John Infranca, Transferable Development Rights Programs: “Post-
Zoning”?, 78 Brook. L. Rev. 435, 464 (2013) (explaining various 
measures in recent TDR programs in New York, meant to ensure that the 
transferable rights have substantial value). 
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model allows that value to be redistributed to the general public, not 
just reshuffled among landowners.87 
The main differences between our auction proposal and existing 
models for public-benefit zoning are, first, the mechanism of value 
capture (auctions rather than scheduled or negotiated public benefits); 
and, second, the state-approval requirement (most states allow local 
governments to enact impact-fee and inclusionary-zoning ordinances 
without getting state approval). Why do it with auctions, and why 
require state-agency approval? We turn to this next. 
B. Why Auctions? 
In contrast to existing mechanisms for value capture, the auction’s 
great advantage is that it obtains “public benefits” in their most 
generally useful form—i.e., as money, which can be spent on 
anything88—while using markets rather than planners to set and 
continually adjust the price. The auction model solves the problem of 
the mispriced regulatory exaction, one which deters development rather 
than extracting value from it. 
In contrast to legislated affordable-housing mandates and impact-
fee schedules, the price of tradeable development allowances would 
automatically adjust to a level that allows all otherwise-viable projects 
in the upzoned area to proceed. To see the intuition, imagine a site—
say, a commercial warehouse—that has been rezoned for high-density 
housing. A developer will pay less for this site under a regime in which 
she must also pay for allowances, compared to an otherwise-similar 
regime in which she could develop the site without redeeming 
allowances. Yet with or without the allowance requirement, competition 
among developers trying to purchase sites will raise the price of the site 
plus the right to build X square feet on the site to the level at which 
developers earn a normal (risk-adjusted) rate of return. The effect of 
introducing the development-allowance requirement is just to 
redistribute the site-plus-right-to-build price between the site’s owner 
and the development allowances’ owners.89 
Because the price of allowances on the after-auction market would 
constantly adjust as conditions change, the auction method of value 
 
87. Several of New York City’s recent TDR programs also allow receiving-
zone landowners to receive extra density or floor-to-area ratio if they make 
a cash payment to the city for public benefits. See Been & Infranca, supra 
note 86, at 450–55. This is very similar to “auctioning the upzone,” except 
that the price of the extra density is set legislatively rather than by 
auction. 
88. Though note that this does not mean there could not be a state mandate 
to use a set percentage to subsidize housing for poor people. There’s a lot 
to be said for such a rule, although it would limit the range of deals that 
could be struck locally in order to forge a city-council majority for 
upzoning. 
89. This assumes a competitive market for development. 
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capture would cushion economic and regulatory shocks. Whereas a fixed 
schedule of fees or in-kind benefits would bring development to a halt 
if changes in developers’ costs make it infeasible to build (while paying 
the fees), the same shock in the auction world would simply reduce 
what developers bid for the allowances. Development would proceed 
apace, albeit with less money flowing into public coffers.90 The auction 
model’s price-adjustment feature also frees up city councils and 
planners to focus their energies on forward-looking, big-picture 
questions about which areas to upzone, rather than being constantly 
diverted by calls to adjust existing fee and public-benefit schedules in 
response to supposedly changed conditions. 
In addition to the fiscal reward for upzoning, our auction model 
would create powerful fiscal incentives for local governments to 
streamline and clarify their permitting protocols, design standards, and 
the like. If a local government continued to use a highly discretionary 
process, the costs of regulatory uncertainty would be borne by the local 
government itself in the form of foregone revenue.91 Bidders would not 
offer very much money for development allowances that merely license 
the owner to haggle with city officials.92 But if the allowances actually 
functioned as entitlements to build, they would be enormously valuable 
in the high-cost, supply-constrained markets that are increasingly 
characteristic of today’s big cities.93 
C. Why State Approval? 
For several mutually reinforcing reasons, we recommend 
conditioning the local right to auction development allowances on state 
approval of the upzoning-with-auctions plan. These reasons include: 
 
90. In an extreme case, the price could fall all the way to zero. The price of 
development allowances on the after-auction market will remain positive 
only to the extent that market participants believe the price of a new unit 
of housing may exceed the cost of developing it on the most-costly-to-
develop sites in the zone. As in any competitive market, prices will be set 
by the marginal buyers and sellers. 
91. One study based on a survey of local planners estimates that permitting 
times for a typical project are three times as long in heavily regulated 
than in lightly regulated communities. See Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 
10, at 7; see also Housing for LA, supra note 72 (providing pro-forma 
examples of how construction delays plus holding costs rapidly erode the 
amount that developers will bid for sites). 
92. Brazil has experimented with development rights auctions, and in the 
City of San Paolo, the allowances sold at depressed prices during a period 
of political uncertainty about whether developers would be able to build 
in the upzoned area. See Julie Kim, CePACs and Their Value Capture 
Viability in the U.S. for Infrastructure Funding 10–11 (Lincoln Inst. of 
Land Pol’y, Working Paper No. WP18JK1, 2018) (describing effects of 
political transition from a mayor who had supported the auctions to a 
new mayor who had criticized the auctions during his campaign). 
93. For a ballpark illustration, see infra text accompanying notes 117–131. 
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screening local regulatory commitments; discouraging “strategic 
downzoning”; answering certain legal objections to the auction model; 
and nudging local governments toward welfare-enhancing standard–
ization of property rights.94 
1. Screening Local Regulatory Commitments 
The auctioning of development allowances would create a contract 
between the local government and the allowances’ purchaser.95 Winning 
bidders would convey money to the local government in exchange for 
promises about the terms for the development-allowances’ use. To the 
extent that these exchanges amount to legally enforceable contracts,96 
they can restrict or condition local regulation of land use in the future—
for good or ill.97 A critical function of state administrative review of 
auction plans is to filter out bad regulatory commitments while allowing 
good ones to take effect.98 
 
94. If the legislature authorizes local governments to set minimum 
“reservation prices” for the auction, state review will also be necessary to 
ensure that the reservation price is set at a reasonable level to guard 
against market failures (e.g., a shortage of bidders due to some exigency), 
rather than at a level which is intended to prevent most of the allowances 
from being sold (as NIMBY groups may wish). 
 It might also be argued that the state-approval step should be used to 
check possible overinvestment in housing construction during market 
“bubbles.” Yet bubbles are notoriously hard to identify in real time, see 
Edward Glaeser et al., A Real Estate Boom with Chinese Characteristics, 
31 J. Econ. Persp. 93, 106–07 (2017) (showing that answering the 
question of whether there is a bubble in Chinese real estate requires 
knowledge of the path of future economic growth for decades), and much 
mischief could result from a state power to tackle bubbles by restricting 
development, rather than with other tools, such as informational remedies 
or restrictions on leveraged investments. Given the scale and consequences 
of the housing shortage in Northeastern and West Coast metro areas, it 
seems delusional to worry about over-building. See Elmendorf, supra note 
15 at 86–89. 
95. Cf. Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: 
Binding Local Governments, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 879 (2011) (examining 
various ways in which property and contract law are used by local 
governments to entrench land use regulations). 
96. In general, local governments may bind themselves to perform or pay 
damages for breaching a contractual regulatory commitment, but the 
remedy of specific performance is only available if expressly authorized by 
the state legislature. See id. at 892–94. 
97. For an illuminating investigation of the use of private law to entrench 
land use regulation, see generally id. 
98. Cf. Serkin, supra note 95, at 933–63 (arguing that regulatory 
entrenchment through private law is neither good nor bad per se, but 
that, because of the stakes, it should be subject to greater deliberation or 
review than regular, non-entrenching public decisions). 
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A short-sighted local government (or one that is controlled by 
NIMBYs) might auction the development allowances created by a 
modest upzone while promising that the local government will never 
upzone again, either citywide or in targeted areas. This promise might 
make the auctioned allowances more valuable, but only by entrenching 
a welfare-reducing, supply-constricting regulatory commitment. 
Other regulatory commitments would probably be welfare 
enhancing. A local government seeking to increase the value of its 
development allowances might bind itself to reforms that curtail neigh–
borhood-gadfly obstructionism, such as by removing certain public-
hearing requirements, or by limiting neighbors’ rights of internal 
appeal.99 If the city’s planning department has a terrible reputation, the 
city might even transfer its project review and approval responsibilities 
to a state agency, or it might promise to compensate the developer if 
the city loses an appeal of a project’s denial. A city could also promise 
not to unilaterally change certain rules that apply to the upzoned sites, 
while reserving the right to change those rules with the state agency’s 
consent. This would create a safety valve to accommodate change if a 
genuine need arises, while giving market participants some assurance 
that if local NIMBYs win the next election, they will not be able to 
shut down new construction and gut the value of extant development 
allowances.100 
The point of these examples is not to say exactly which regulatory 
commitments should or should not be made in connection with a 
development-allowance action. It is merely to illustrate a range of 
possible commitments, some of which are almost surely welfare-
reducing—but perhaps tempting for a NIMBY-dominated or fiscally 
pressured local government—and others of which are very likely 
welfare-enhancing. By conditioning the right to auction development 
allowances on state administrative approval, the state can ensure that 
 
99. Cf. Einstein et al., supra note 12, at 13–14 (documenting severe 
overrepresentation of homeowners at public meetings on development 
projects); San Francisco General Plan, 2014 Housing Element I.90–
I.91 (2015), https://default.sfplanning.org/plans-and-programs/planning-for-
the-city/housing-element/2014HousingElement-AllParts_ADOPTED_ 
 web.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BTP-E75Z] (discussing neighbor-initiated 
“discretionary reviews” by Planning Commission as a significant barrier to 
development in “high income areas” of the city). 
100. Technically, if the mechanism for entrenching the regulatory commitment 
is the contract by which development allowances are conveyed to winning 
bidders, a local government would probably be allowed to break the 
commitment so long as it compensated allowance holders for any 
associated reduction in the value of their investment. See Serkin, supra 
note 95, at 916–17 (noting that reliance damages are usually the only 
remedy for counterparties when a government breaches a contract). For 
local regulatory commitments to be specifically enforceable, the state 
would have to authorize this in enabling legislation. See infra note 175 
and accompanying text. 
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local regulatory commitments made in connection with the auctions are 
reasonable and aligned with state goals. 
2. A Check on Strategic Downzoning 
Another reason for the state-approval requirement is to curtail 
strategic downzoning. The concern is that a city with market power 
might try to boost auction prices by reducing permissible densities or 
building envelopes on non-upzoned sites, or by enacting extremely 
cumbersome permitting requirements for projects within the develop–
ment baseline. This concern is not just theoretical: local officials in São 
Paulo, Brazil (the one country that has authorized development-rights 
auctions) downzoned the entire city before auctioning an upzone in 
select locations.101 
The risk of strategic downzoning is not unique to our proposal. It 
exists whenever cities have an opportunity to extract value via land-
use regulation.102 A handbook on density-bonus zoning notes the 
importance of reducing the existing base zoning in many cases.103 
Taking this message to heart, Culver City, California, cut the base 
density of its mixed-use zone roughly in half when it adopted a density 
bonus ordinance in 2008.104 
A state-approval requirement would not end all abuses, but it 
should help to limit them. The state agency could deny approval to 
local governments that have downsized their aggregate building 
envelope since the auction-authorizing statute took effect, or that 
discriminate against projects that do not require development 
allowances (for example, by subjecting within-baseline projects to more 
onerous review standards or procedures than above-baseline projects). 
3. Answering Legal Objections to “Zoning for Dollars” 
There is also a legalistic reason for the state-approval requirement. 
We noted earlier that some courts have objected to the explicit 
exchange of rezoning for cash, seeing it as corrupting what should be a 
 
101. Hiroaki Suzuki et al., The World Bank, Financing Transit-




102. See generally Steven J. Eagle, The Perils of Regulatory Property in Land 
Use Litigation, 54 Washburn L.J. 1, 1–3 (2014) (examining the social 
costs of regulatory property). 
103. See 2 Eric Damian Kelly & Patrick J. Rohan, Zoning and Land 





104. See Calavita & Wolfe, supra note 49, at 29. 
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rational, public-spirited planning process.105 The state-approval 
requirement defangs this objection. 
Under our proposal, the state, without a hand in the till, would 
choose the criteria that make an upzone in the public interest. A 
similarly disinterested state agency would decide whether a particular 
proposed upzoning meets those criteria. The criteria could be narrow 
and rigid (e.g., “Are the sites to be upzoned located within one-quarter 
mile of a transit stop?”), or very broad (e.g., “Are the sites to be 
upzoned safe for housing, and located in a region where the price of 
housing materially exceeds the usual cost of construction?”). 
In a legal challenge, our scheme’s public-profit quality could be 
defended not as a way of raising revenue, but as a rational means by 
which the state incentivizes local compliance with the state’s housing 
and land-use policies. 
4. Standardizing Vertical Property Rights 
The final reason for the state-approval requirement is to nudge local 
governments toward the welfare-enhancing standardization of property 
rights.106 As we explained earlier, one of the principal problems with 
case-by-case land-use regulation is that it makes the contours of urban 
property rights very difficult for outsiders to discern.107 These 
information costs are probably responsible in part for the massive 
disparity between the costs of infill and greenfield housing develop–
ment.108 
It is possible to accommodate variation in urban character and 
preferences within a framework of fairly standardized property rights. 
Japan provides a good example. The Japanese government has created 
a menu of twelve zoning classifications.109 Local governments have 
broad leeway to decide which zones to select from the menu and where 
to put them; but local governments have only limited authority to 
 
105. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
106. Cf. Henry E. Smith, Standardization in Property Law, in Research 
Handbook on the Economics of Property Law (Kenneth Ayotte & 
Henry E. Smith eds., 2012) (restating the information-costs theory of 
standardization in Anglo-American property law); Thomas W. Merrill & 
Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: the 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (2000) (developing now-
canonical theory about property rights and information costs); Hills & 
Schleicher, supra note 25, at 135 (critiquing Merrill and Smith for not 
addressing contemporary public-law sources of information costs 
concerning property rights). 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 71–76. 
108. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. 
109. André Sorensen et al., Urban Renaissance as Intensification: Building 
Regulation and the Rescaling of Place Governance in Tokyo’s High-Rise 
Manshon Boom, 47 Urban Studies 556, 562 (2010). 
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supplement the nationally defined zones with custom local overlays.110 
Nor can local governments use permitting delays or discretion as 
leverage to impose de facto requirements that go beyond the written 
standards, because developers may elect to have their projects privately 
certified for compliance with the applicable de jure standards.111 It is 
probably not a coincidence that, since the 1990s, Tokyo has experienced 
a huge expansion of its housing stock with little runup in prices, while 
similar “superstar” cities in the U.S. and other industrialized countries 
have experienced huge price increases but little housing-stock growth.112 
The case for auctioning the upzone certainly does not depend on a 
state’s adoption of the Japanese model of land-use regulation, but we 
think the auction model (with a state-approval requirement) could 
bring about the gradual, voluntary standardization of zoning in 
American states. Initially, a state’s housing agency would promulgate 
a Japan-like menu of standardized zones and procedures, while letting 
local governments decide whether to opt in to menu-based zoning. No 
local government would be required to use the menu, but in cases where 
an upzoning plan’s approval is a close call (maybe there is some 
evidence of strategic downzoning), the state agency could give the 
benefit of the doubt to local governments that opt for menu-based 
zoning in the upzoned area. 
Menu-based upzoning is likely to be especially attractive to smaller 
jurisdictions. Other things equal, a smaller jurisdiction will have fewer 
resources for crafting and implementing its own customized 
arrangements. National developers also have less of an incentive to learn 
smaller jurisdictions’ idiosyncratic rules (compared to localities with 
numerous high-value parcels), so smaller jurisdictions are likely to 
realize much higher prices for their development allowances if they use 
 
110. A landscape preservation law adopted in 2005 allows some local overlays. 
See André Sorensen, Evolving Property Rights in Japan: Patterns and 
Logics of Change, 48 Urban Studies 471, 486 (2011); Konomi Ikebe, A 
Study About the Japanese Landscape Law Including Cultural Landscape and 
Historic City Preservation and Restoration Act, 66 HortResearch 1, 2 (2012). 
Cities also have some authority to create special use districts. See Anthony 
C. Petrillo Jr., Japanese Zoning and Its Applicability in American Cities 36–
37 (Mar. 2017) (unpublished B.S. student project, California Polytechnic 
State University), https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi 
 ?article=1173&context=crpsp [https://perma.cc/8J2S-KQUB]. 
111. Sorensen et al., supra note 109, at 570. 
112. See Daniel Shoag, The Hamilton Project, Removing Barriers to 
Accessing High-Productivity Places 13–14 (2019), https://www 
 .hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/Shoag_PP_web_20190128.pdf [https:// 
 perma.cc/E477-ZBEN]. To be sure, the reason for this may have as much 
or more to do with the national government’s ability to effectively upzone 
urban land with subtle administrative changes to the Building Standards 
Law, than with cost savings from standardization of urban property 
rights. See Sorensen et al., supra note 109, at 565–71 (detailing a series of 
changes made from 1987 to 2003 that increased building envelopes within 
existing zones). 
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menu-based zoning. As more and more small jurisdictions elect to use 
the menu, developers will become increasingly familiar with it, and the 
value of using the menu will therefore increase for everyone. Eventually 
some bigger jurisdictions may start to participate, too. In this way, the 
fiscal incentives created by auctioning the upzone could help to bring 
about the gradual standardization, within states, of vertical property 
rights in American cities.113 
III. Auctions and the Political Economy of 
Residential Densification 
Whether or to what extent our model generates denser residential 
land use ultimately depends not on whether auctions are theoretically 
more efficient than legislated-schedule or negotiated-deal modes of 
value capture, but on how our model affects the political economy of 
land-use regulation at local and state levels. Part II touched on some of 
the relevant local dynamics. This Part pulls those threads together, and 
also considers how the auction model would interact with existing state 
frameworks for superintending local regulation. 
A. Auctions in Local Political Context: Facilitating Sticky Upzoning 
Deals 
It is now widely accepted that neighborhood-level interests—and 
particularly but not exclusively homeowners’ interests—are the main 
source of political resistance to increased density in residential metro 
areas.114 Hills and Schleicher have argued that upzoning is therefore 
more likely to occur if zoning changes are enacted through a procedural 
framework that knits multiple neighborhoods together into a citywide 
deal, rather than by addressing each neighborhood or project in 
isolation.115 The prospect of a citywide deal should engage business and 
municipal union interests, both of which would benefit from a 
substantial increase in the citywide housing supply even though they 
have little at stake in any given project. Neighbors, by contrast, tend 
 
113. To be clear, if the zoning menu is state-promulgated, the standardization 
is likely to occur within but perhaps not across states. (Japan achieved 
national standardizations, but only through a national menu.) 
 Note that one of us has argued at length that local government finance 
would be improved generally if local governments were provided with 
state-approved menus of financing tools accompanied by state oversight. 
See generally Darien Shanske, The (Now Urgent) Case for State-Level 
Monitoring of Local Government Finances: Protecting Localities from 
Trump’s “Potemkin Villages of Nothing”, 20 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. 
Pol’y 773 (2017). 
114. See sources cited in supra note 12. 
115. Hills & Schleicher, supra note 25, at 111–15. 
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to be most engaged by concrete projects and less attentive to 
generalized plans. 
Our auction model is congruent with Hills and Schleicher’s 
“citywide deals” approach, and in fact should make such deals both 
easier to assemble initially and harder to unravel later on. First, because 
the auction model offers a more efficient mode of value capture than 
legislated fees and in-kind benefits, it should generate much more 
revenue from upzonining, which local politicians can use to pay off 
groups on the margins of the NIMBY coalition and to bring bystanders 
into the pro-development coalition.116 
The potential surplus is truly enormous. A back-of-the-envelope 
calculation for San Francisco makes this clear. On average each year, a 
paltry 2500 new housing units are produced in San Francisco.117 
Construction costs (at the time of this writing) are very high—about 
$350 per square foot—reflecting the city’s byzantine code requirements 
and high labor costs.118 Housing in the city sells on average for about 
$1150 per square foot.119 San Francisco’s impact and processing fees for 
a typical 1000 square-foot apartment or condo come to roughly 
$70,000,120 or $70 per square foot. Soft costs—architectural, engineering, 
and permitting fees—are commonly estimated at twenty percent of 
construction costs.121 
 
116. The upzoning surplus will be especially big if the deal standardizes 
property rights by selecting zones from a Japan-style menu and commits 
the city to streamlined permitting. 
117. S.F. Planning Dep’t, 2018 San Francisco Housing Inventory 6 (2019), 
https://commissions.sfplanning.org/cpcpackets/1996.0013CWP_2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MQY2-ECQR]. The city’s total housing stock is about 
400,000 units. Id. at 15. The annual rate of production translates into 
about 25,000 units per decade, barely more than 6% of the current stock. 
By comparison, economically productive metro regions in the South and 
Southwest have increased their (much less expensive) housing supply by 
30–60% in barely more than a decade. See Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 
10, at 19 fig.3. 
118. Carolina Reid & Hayley Raetz, Perspectives: Practitioners Weigh 
in on Drivers of Rising Housing Construction Costs in San 
Francisco 1 (2018), http://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/uploads/San_ 
 Francisco_Construction_Cost_Brief_-_Terner_Center_January_2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QJY4-BV9M]. 
119. See San Francisco, CA Real Estate Trends, Trulia, https://www.trulia.com/ 
 real_estate/San_Francisco-California/market-trends/ [https://perma.cc/ 
 H8XJ-B3NS] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020) (showing that new construction 
likely sells for more). 
120. San Francisco General Plan, supra note 99, at I.95 tbl.I-62. 
121. The Terner Center for Housing Innovation at UC-Berkeley uses this 
assumption in its pro-forma calculator. See Housing Development 
Dashboard: Development Calculator, U.C.-Berkeley Terner Ctr. for 
Housing Innovation, https://ternercenter2.berkeley.edu/proforma/ [https: 
 //perma.cc/9SXF-UYUL] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
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If we further assume that developers must gross about twenty 
percent on their investment as compensation for risk, transaction, and 
unavoidable holding costs (time from site acquisition to project 
completion under a speedy permitting regime),122 the potential 
“uncollected” land value residual on a typical 1000 square foot condo 
in San Francisco is about $430 per square foot.123 At the current 
production rate of 2500 units per year, that is roughly $1.075 billion 
each year—a sum approximately half the amount of the city’s 
discretionary general fund,124 and twice the transit agency’s capital 
budget.125 
Of course, many of those 2500 units come from projects within the 
“development baseline,” and so the corresponding development rights 
could not be auctioned.126 By upzoning, however, the city could create 
a lot of new buildable space above the baseline.127 Assume that the city, 
responding to fiscal incentives, upzones and triples the rate of housing 
 
122. Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 10, at 8 (estimating that the typical 
developer, nationally, requires a 17% return on land and construction 
costs). 
123. 0.8*$1150 - 1.2*$350 - 70 = $430. 
124. S.F. MTA Board Approves $1.2B Two-Year Operating Budget, Metro 
Mag. (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.metro-magazine.com/management-
operations/news/729254/san-francisco-mta-board-approves-1-2b-two-year-
operating-budget [https://perma.cc/F4WM-KGJS] (reporting capital budget 
of $513.5 million for FY19 and $630.8 million for fiscal year 2020). 
125. Dominic Fracassa, SF’s Budget Soars by $937 Million and Will Top $11 
Billion for First Time, S.F. Chronicle (May 31, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/SF-s-budget-soars-by-937-
million-and-will-top-12955416.php [https://perma.cc/PE56-WKVJ] 
(explaining that most of the city’s budget is controlled by enterprise 
agencies and set-asides, leaving $2.2 billion to the city council’s 
discretion). 
126. This is factually incorrect; most projects in the city require a 
rezoning or other regulatory exemption. See Mac Taylor, 
Legis. Analyst’s Off., Do Communities Adequately Plan for 
Housing? 8–9 (2017), https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2017/3605/plan-for-
housing-030817.pdf [https://perma.cc/775D-TPUL]. 
127. Hunter Oatman-Stanford, The Bad Design that Created One of America’s 
Worst Housing Crises, Fast Company (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www. 
 fastcompany.com/90242388/the-bad-design-that-created-one-of-americas-
worst-housing-crises [https://perma.cc/93AY-LEB6]. In 1978, the city 
was drastically downzoned. The 1978 reforms established 40’ height limits 
in most of the city, eliminating an estimated 180,000 potential units of 
new housing. Id. Today the city’s density is about one-third that of 
Paris’s. See Adam Brinklow, Mapping What SF Would Be Like if it Were 
as Dense as New York, Paris, and Manila, Curbed: S.F. (Mar. 8, 2017, 
2:48 PM), https://sf.curbed.com/2017/3/8/14856316/san-francisco-density-
map [https://perma.cc/XAG8-SM62]. 
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production, yielding a still-modest 7500 new units annually.128 The 
potential auction revenue from the additional 5000 units—$2.15 billion 
annually—would double the city’s discretionary general fund. 
These numbers should be taken with several grains of salt. If San 
Francisco auctioned development allowances while leaving the rest of 
its regulatory apparatus as-is, we do not think developers would bid up 
the price of allowances to anywhere near the $430 per square foot on 
which our eye-popping calculations rest.129 Developers must also 
account for any in-kind contributions or fees the city demands of them 
(site improvements, affordable housing, etc.), as well as the city’s 
notoriously lengthy and unpredictable permitting process.130 But that’s 
precisely the point: if the city could auction development allowances, it 
would then face the opportunity cost of its discretionary permitting 
process, and it would have a strong fiscal incentive to eliminate in-kind 
requirements that generate less value for the city than they cost 
developers. The city would also bear the cost of its many idiosyncratic 
building-code amendments, which have pushed construction costs in 
the city far above the national average for similar buildings.131 
 
128. 7,500 units per year translates into a per-decade housing supply increase 
of about 19%, roughly half of what affordable and economically productive 
regions manage to produce. See Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 10, at 19 
fig.3. 
129. See N.Y.U. Furman Ctr. for Real Estate & Urb. Pol’y, supra note 
23, at 9–10. Researchers in New York City have documented wide 
variability in the per-square-foot price reflected in TDR transactions, 
ranging from well under $100 to nearly $500 per square foot. Id. at 9. 
Some of this variability may be due to the thinness of the market, and 
the lack of readily available information about the price of transfers. See 
id. at 13 (reporting that the developer of one project in 2008 bought rights 
from several sellers at prices ranging from $248 to $435 per square foot). 
130. Julie Littman, It May Take a Recession to Solve San Francisco’s 
Permitting Backlog, Bisnow (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.bisnow.com/ 
 san-francisco/news/construction-development/san-francisco-real-estate-
business-and-politics-87757 [https://perma.cc/TX8R-AM3V]. Developers 
might also refrain from bidding up allowances to the full $430 per square 
foot because they expect housing supply to increase regionally and prices 
to come down, in response to the auction incentive, or because they expect 
allowances to be used in some future year and discount their bids 
accordingly. See Vicki Been et al., The Market for TDRs in New York 
City 29 (Nov. 1, 2012) (unpublished paper) (on file with author). 
131. Reid & Raetz, supra note 118, at 2. In 2017, the national average 
construction cost for an eight- to twenty-four-story building was about 
$230 per square foot, see Fannie Mae, Multifamily Market 
Commentary—March 2017, at 1 (2017), available at https://www 
 .fanniemae.com/resources/file/research/emma/pdf/MF_Market_Commen
tary_031517.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJX6-84ZL], which is one-third less 
than San Francisco’s $350-per-square-foot average for all construction 
types, see Reid & Raetz, supra note 118, at 1. If San Francisco could 
simplify its building code enough to bridge even half of the gap (i.e., 
bringing costs down by $60 per square foot), that alone would be worth 
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The bottom line is that for high-cost, supply-constrained cities, the 
right to auction development allowances would not be a case of fiscal 
tinkering on the margins. The potential financial payoff from upzoning, 
permit streamlining, and building-code reform could be massive, and 
there would be myriad opportunities for ambitious politicians to create 
or expand pro-development political coalitions. In one city, tax refunds 
for homeowners might cinch the upzoning deal;132 in another, it might 
be pristine new parks and schools, or a world-class subway system. This 
is for the politicians to figure out. And there is every reason to think 
they would figure it out, for local governments have proven quite 
responsive to fiscal incentives in the past.133 The adoption of flexible 
zoning is one example; another is zoning for commercial development 
in pursuit of sales tax revenue.134 
To be sure, there is likely to be considerable heterogeneity in high-
cost jurisdictions’ responses to this new fiscal incentive. Rich, 
homogeneous suburbs in which nearly every voter is a homeowner—
nay, a white homeowner—may remain largely unmoved. Racial 
animosities and fears undoubtedly play a central role in suburban land-
use regulation.135 But there is plenty of variation across municipalities 
 
$150 million annually, or $450 million if the city tripled the rate of housing 
production. 
132. Cf. William A. Fischel, Commentary, Recalibrating Local Politics to 
Increase the Supply of Housing, 42 Reg. 38, 44–45 (2019) (suggesting, in 
response to Elmendorf, that some of the upzone-auctioning proceeds 
should be used to pay off incumbent homeowners); David Schleicher, City 
Unplanning, 122 Yale L.J. 1670, 1725–32 (2013) (suggesting tax-
increment financing with payoffs to existing homeowners). 
133. The state could also facilitate these deals by making local fiscal 
commitments undertaken in connection with a state-approved auction 
plan enforceable as state law. See infra Part IV.E. 
134. See Karen Chapple, The Fiscal Trade-off: Sprawl, the Conversion of 
Land, and Wage Decline in California’s Metropolitan Regions, 177 
Landscape & Urb. Plan. 294, 298 (2018); Robert W. Wassmer, 
Fiscalisation of Land Use, Urban Growth Boundaries and Non-Central 
Retail Sprawl in the Western United States, 39 Urb. Stud. 1307, 1324 
(2002); Paul G. Lewis, Retail Politics: Local Sales Taxes and the 
Fiscalization of Land Use, 15 Econ. Dev. Q. 21, 31 (2001). This is not to 
say that local governments are budget maximizers. Cf. Daryl Levinson, 
Empire Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 
915 (2004) (critiquing arguments that rest on this assumption). Politicians 
are directly responsive to political incentives, not financial incentives. Our 
point is simply that that auction model would make upzoning more 
politically attractive by giving local officials a more efficient way to tap 
and distribute the potential surplus from upzoning. 
135. See, e.g., Jessica Trounstine, Segregation by Design: Local 
Politics and Inequality in American Cities 30 (2018); Camille 
Zubrinsky Charles, The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation, 29 
Ann. Rev. Soc. 167, 191 (2003) (“The overall conclusion to be drawn is 
that active racial prejudice is a critical component of preferences for 
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in the relative proportions of homeowners versus renters, whites versus 
nonwhites, residents of multifamily buildings versus residents of single-
family homes, and Democrats versus Republicans—all of which are 
associated with different land-use preferences.136 Obviously, in many 
jurisdictions, there is also significant neighborhood-to-neighborhood 
variation in these proportions.137 So while the fiscal incentive to 
“auction the upzone” is unlikely to generate pro-development coalitions 
everywhere, politicians will likely manage to assemble such coalitions 
in many cities, at least for the purpose of upzoning certain 
neighborhoods or collections of neighborhoods. 
As these coalitions come together, our auction framework will help 
them to forge more durable upzoning deals than are possible today, 
deals that local anti-development factions would have difficulty 
unwinding. The deals will be more durable de facto because—in 
contrast to legislated-fee schedules for value extraction—the market’s 
pricing of the development allowances will act as a shock absorber on 
NIMBY activism. We saw in Part II that a fee schedule that universally 
drives the land-value residual down to nearly zero would powerfully 
motivate NIMBY groups to invest in virtually any potential regulation 
that promises to even somewhat increase the cost or risks of 
development. By contrast, under the auction model of value capture, 
modest NIMBY triumphs would be quickly capitalized into the after-
auction price of development allowances and bids at future auctions. 
Development projects would still be profitable for developers unless the 
NIMBY measure is so extreme as to drive allowance prices to zero. 
Our framework also supports durable upzoning deals by authorizing 
city councils to enact zoning and permitting reforms that, with the 
state’s approval, will bind future city councils. The model induces an 
asymmetry in the stickiness of municipal policymaking: when the city 
council is controlled by factions whose land-use preferences align with 
the state agency’s, the council will be able to enact entrenched, hard-
to-change zoning and permitting reforms. But when factions opposed 
to the state’s housing agenda control the city council, they will be able 
to enact only ordinary, non-entrenched ordinances. This asymmetry 
cuts in favor of housing development to the extent that the state agency 
has more consistent pro-housing and pro-density preferences than most 
city councils. On balance this is likely to be the case, particularly if the 
 
integration, and therefore, the persistence of racially segregated 
communities.”). 
136. See, e.g., Mummolo & Nall, supra note 1, at 52 (presenting evidence of 
land-use preferences across different groups); Hankinson, supra note 12, 
at 473–74; Elmendorf, supra note 15, at 139–40 (arguing that geographic 
variation in preferences for new housing is one of the key stylized facts to 
which policy should respond). 
137. This is in part a legacy of racist policies such as redlining. See 
Trounstine, supra note 135, at 32. 
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state agency is controlled by the governor.138 The governor, responsive 
to a statewide electorate, is less likely to cater to a specific 
neighborhood’s interests than is a city council whose members answer 
to small territorial districts.139 
To be sure, there are other ways for states to enable local pro-
housing factions to make binding upzoning and permit-streamlining 
commitments without auctioning development rights.140 The auction 
model is nonetheless useful for this purpose, both because it provides a 
convenient mechanism for effectuating the commitment (a contract 
between the local government and development-allowance purchasers) 
and because development-allowance auctions would make local govern–
ments confront the opportunity cost (in foregone auction revenue) of 
not committing to a quick, predictable process for processing develop–
ment applications on the upzoned sites. 
B. Auctions in Statewide Political Context: Ameliorating Informational 
Asymmetries 
So far we have presented our model as a fiscal inducement for local 
governments to allow greater density in accordance with state policy. 
The model increases the size of “pie” that can be split through an 
upzoning deal, and it creates a policymaking asymmetry such that local 
YIMBY factions can more easily entrench their land-use preferences. 
But there is another benefit as well for states, such as California, that 
require local governments to periodically plan for needed housing and 
submit those plans for state review.141 
 
138. See Elmendorf, supra note 15, at 143–44 (listing structural reasons why 
governors are likely to be more pro-housing on average than state 
legislators or local officials). 
139. Recent empirical studies find that cities that switch from at-large to 
districted elections become much less accommodative of development. See 
Michael Hankinson & Asya Magazinnik, How Electoral Institutions Shape 
the Efficiency and Equity of Distributive Policy (Sept. 17, 2019), 
http://mhankinson.com/assets/hankinson_magazinnik.pdf (finding that 
plausibly exogenous shifts from at-large to districted local elections induced 
by California Voting Rights Act caused 46% decline in multifamily housing 
production); Evan Mast, Why Do NIMBYs Win? Local Control and Housing 
Supply (Dec. 2019), https://www.dropbox.com/s/76jq4x0x2yc2c54/mast_ 
 at_large_ward.pdf?dl=0 (finding similar effect from shifts induced by 
national Voting Rights Act). 
140. See, e.g., Elmendorf, supra note 15, at 129 (suggesting revisions to the 
“West Coast” model for periodically reviewing local land-use plans, which 
would enable local pro-housing factions to entrench liberal land-use 
regimes). 
141. Many of the nation’s high-cost housing markets are located in such states. 
See generally id. at 94–95 (explaining that the West Coast states all 
require periodic planning subject to state review, and that Massachusetts 
and New Jersey have also created strong incentives for local governments 
to submit affordable-housing plans for state review). 
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State agencies trying to gauge the adequacy of local housing plans 
operate at an enormous informational disadvantage relative to local 
governments. The informational problem arises because local govern–
ments may comply with state requirements to zone for certain amounts 
and types of housing while maneuvering to make that housing nearly 
impossible to build. For example, if the state tells a local government 
to zone for 10,000 new housing units at a density of at least thirty units 
per acre,142 the local government could selectively upzone parcels that 
are small, steep, contaminated, lacking infrastructure, or occupied by 
existing uses that make redevelopment unlikely. Or the local 
government make fees and exactions prohibitively expensive. Or it 
could make the projects economically infeasible by subjecting them to 
costly parking and site-improvement requirements, or idiosyncratic 
building standards. Or it could enact setback requirements, or height 
and open-space “overlays,” which reduce the effective building envelope 
on actual lots to a size that cannot accommodate anything like the 
nominally-allowed density. Or it could impose discretionary design 
standards and procedures for internal appeals so that project opponents 
can drag out the permitting process for years, killing development with 
holding costs. 
States can, and do, try to monitor all of this,143 but it is a Sisyphean 
task, made all the more difficult by the fact that many of the tools in 
the local regulatory toolbox can be used for socially beneficial purposes 
(maximization of the joint value of nearby properties), neutral purposes 
(capture and redistribution of value), or deleterious purposes (killing 
economically efficient projects). For example, any given inclusionary 
zoning ordinance could be either a reasonable effort to extract locational 
value and convert it into subsidized housing, a bludgeon designed to 
 
142. California and New Jersey effectively require local governments to plan 
for affordable housing by zoning at certain minimum densities. See Cal. 
Gov’t Code § 65583.2 (2011); In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 6 
A.3d 445, 461–64 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (invalidating regulation 
which, in the court’s view, would have allowed local governments to comply 
with their affordable-housing obligations by zoning land at insufficient 
density and with excessive BMR requirements), aff’d as modified sub nom. 
In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96, 74 A.3d 893 (N.J. 2013). For large cities, 
thirty units per acre is the presumptive minimum density under California 
law for lower-income housing sites. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 65583.2 
(2011). 
143. In California, the housing element of each local government’s general plan 
must include an analysis of constraints to the “development of housing 
for all income levels,” Cal. Gov’t Code § 65583(a)(5)–(6) (2011), and a 
“schedule of actions” to “[a]ddress and, where appropriate and legally 
possible, remove constraints,” id. § 65583(c). The state agency charged 
with periodically reviewing and certifying housing elements has issued 
detailed guidelines about this analysis and program. See Building Blocks, 
Cal. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., http://www.hcd.ca.gov/community-
development/building-blocks/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/G3DB-988B] 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2020). 
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kill market-rate development by making it prohibitively expensive 
citywide, or a subtly devious device to eliminate market-rate develop–
ment in most neighborhoods even as development remains profitable on 
a handful of large, vacant sites in prime locations. It is not enough for 
the state oversight agency to know that a local government has an 
inclusionary requirement; the agency must figure out how it actually 
works, in combination with all the other local requirements. The same 
can be said for most any other component of the local government’s 
development-regulation regime. 
The informational problem comes into stark relief if one peruses a 
few of the “housing elements” that California requires local govern–
ments to submit periodically for state review and approval. A housing 
element must include an inventory of developable sites and an analysis 
showing that those sites can accommodate the local government’s share 
of “regional housing need” for the planning cycle.144 Local governments 
and the state housing agency both understand that the official zoning 
classification of a site may badly overstate the site’s actual development 
potential. The housing element must therefore include an assessment of 
each site’s “realistic” capacity.145 Some housing elements use simple 
rules of thumb, such as assuming that eighty-five percent of zoned 
capacity is realistic for inventory sites if recently approved projects have 
realized about eighty-five percent of nominal capacity.146 Other housing 
elements use complicated algorithms, embedding questionable assump–
tions in pages of computer code.147 Still others purport to rely on what 
developers said about the capacity of identified sites.148 (How is the 
state agency supposed to judge the credibility of developers whom the 
local government selected to interview?) Needless to say, the amount 
of new housing actually permitted by California’s local governments 
 
144. See Elmendorf, supra note 15, at 105. 
145. Cal. Gov’t Code § 65883.2(c) (2011). 
146. See, e.g., City of San Diego, General Plan: Housing Element 
2013–2020, at HE-17 (2013), available at https://www.sandiego.gov/ 
 sites/default/files/legacy/planning/genplan/heu/pdf/housingelementfull.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9U4M-Y5Z6]. This is a dubious rule of thumb, because 
the sites on which development is observed to occur may be much easier 
to develop at 85% of zoned capacity than is the typical site in the site 
inventory. The hard-to-develop sites may not be developed at all. 
147. See, e.g., San Francisco General Plan, supra note 99, at app. D 
(detailing assumptions by zoning district, while doing nothing to verify with 
housing-outcomes data whether parcels with the stated characteristics are 
actually likely to be developed at the stated densities over the eight-year 
planning cycle). 
148. See, e.g., City of Redwood City, General Plan app. B (2014), 
available at https://www.redwoodcity.org/home/showdocument?id=7144 
[https://perma.cc/YM3D-2HQS]. 
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pales in comparison to the ostensible site capacities claimed in the 
housing elements.149 
Now imagine that each of California’s local governments, at the 
beginning of the planning cycle, auctioned development allowances 
equal to their housing element’s claimed capacity. Imagine also that the 
development allowances were time-limited, expiring at the end of the 
cycle. If a housing element greatly overstated the inventory sites’ 
aggregate capacity, then the price of the corresponding development 
allowances would be very low, as the marginal development allowance 
in such a jurisdiction would almost never be used. 
The investors who purchase development allowances would also 
have a strong incentive to ferret out the most problematic constraints 
and relay this information to state regulators. If they can get the 
problematic constraints removed, they value of their development-
allowance holdings would rise. To be sure, the owners of site-inventory 
parcels have similar incentives today, but the arbitrage strategy of 
buying sites in hard-to-develop jurisdictions and then lobbying the state 
agency to push the local government to remove constraints comes with 
higher transaction costs. Compared to the market in land, the develop–
ment-allowance market should be more liquid, standardized, and 
transparent. Land parcels differ from one another in many ways that 
affect value: size, location, soils, existing uses, possible contamination, 
and so forth. Development allowances, by contrast, would be perfectly 
fungible within market tiers. Each allowance would entitle its owner to 
exactly the same thing: the opportunity to build a given number of 
square feet, within the new zoning envelope and above the development 
baseline, on any parcel within a defined area. 
The hypothetical we have sketched is somewhat unrealistic because 
California probably could not require local governments to auction all 
of their claimed development capacity.150 But this thought experiment 
nonetheless illustrates a number of important points. 
First, any time a local government purports to upzone, the actual 
amount of practically buildable capacity will be a mystery to anyone 
who lacks detailed, insider knowledge about how the zoning map 
interacts with site conditions and all of the other local requirements 
and development-permitting procedures. Investors in the development-
allowance market would have an economic incentive to figure this out, 
and to the extent that they remain uncertain, they will discount their 
 
149. Monkkonen & Friedman, supra note 20, at 2. 
150. Some of those capacities are likely to be within the development baseline. 
There are also probably constitutional as well as prudential limitations on 
how low the development baseline could be. A court might find a taking 
if the local government required parcel owners to purchase development 
allowances in order to make any residential use of their property. Further, 
as a matter of market design, it may be better not to auction all of the 
allowances at once. See infra Part IV.A. 
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bids accordingly. Because cities will want to get high prices for their 
development allowances, they will try not to auction more develop–
ment-allowance square footage within a zone than actually exists. By 
monitoring the amount of auctioned capacity in each jurisdiction, and 
the price at which the allowances trade relative to the price of finished 
housing in the jurisdiction,151 the state can get a decent how much 
above-baseline capacity in a zone or tier actually exists.152 This is a 
much easier task for a lightly staffed state agency than figuring out how 
the mass of land-use regulations in each local jurisdiction interact to 
yield practical development capacity—or lack thereof. 
Second, to the extent that state courts or agencies have the 
authority to make local governments remove constraints, the develop–
ment-allowance market’s existence should improve the flow of 
information to state regulators about particularly severe constraints. 
Arbitrageurs who specialize in identifying removable constraints and 
relaying this information to the state agency will scour the practices of 
jurisdictions whose development allowances are inexpensive relative to 
the price of housing. If they find removable constraints, they will buy 
up those allowances, notify the agency, and sell the allowances at a 
profit once the agency cracks down on the local government. 
Third, the existence of a local right to auction the developable space 
created by upzoning should make it easier for the state agency to 
identify bad-actor local governments, those that are using the tools of 
public-benefit zoning to kill development rather than to extract value 
from it. Local governments that mean to extract value would opt in to 
the auction regime; whereas those that intend to thwart development 
would have little reason to participate. If bad-actor local governments 
were to participate, it would be easy enough for the state agency to see 
through their pretenses, since they would either elect to auction only a 
very small amount of their nominal development capacity, or their 
allowances’ price would be very low, reflecting the market’s belief that 
that jurisdiction’s marginal allowances will never be used. 
One last point. It is common for local governments to defend 
barriers to housing development by appealing to convention and peer-
 
151. To restate this point more precisely: the agency would want to monitor 
the gap between development allowance price and the counterfactual land 
value residual that would be realized if the local government did not 
inflate construction costs with unnecessary code and labor requirements. 
Monitoring the gap between housing prices and allowance prices should 
be a pretty good proxy, because the costs of building materials and labor 
does not vary greatly from one jurisdiction to the next. On interjurisdictional 
construction-cost variation, see Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 10; 
Romem, supra note 10. 
152. To be sure, the reason for the lack of “practical capacity” may not be 
excessively stringent local land use controls. Maybe the problem is 
excessively small parcels, or valuable existing uses on many parcels, or 
contaminated soils, or some other hazard that precludes redevelopment. 
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jurisdiction practice.153 Under the auction regime, local governments 
would have a meaningful fiscal incentive to figure out whether local 
requirements that raise development costs and generate permitting 
delays also reasonably advance an important public purpose. Some 
practices that are now conventional, such as discretionary design review 
of mid-size projects that comply with the zoning code’s objective 
requirements, would probably be abandoned.154 As the auction-part–
icipating jurisdictions remove these requirements, other jurisdictions 
could no longer defend them as conventional. By observing patterns of 
local regulatory reform in the auction-participating jurisdictions, the 
state housing agency could ascertain which local requirements and 
procedures are reasonable methods for coordinating land use, and which 
are just levers for obstructionists. 
IV. Objections 
There are, of course, a range of possible objections to our proposal. 
This Part addresses those that we consider most significant. 
A. Allowance Owners as an Antidevelopment Interest Group? 
Our local-political-economy analysis emphasized the opportunities 
that auctions would provide for city officials to convert latent 
“developable value” into pro-development political coalitions and major 
upzonings.155 Our state-level discussion highlighted ways in which 
allowance prices and allowance owners could help state regulators 
identify local barriers to development.156 But a darker possibility should 
 
153. See, e.g., City of Redwood City, General Plan, supra note 148, at 
H-84 (“A survey of neighboring jurisdictions (East Palo Alto, Belmont, 
and San Carlos) indicates that permit fees in Redwood City are very 
similar to those found in neighboring San Carlos and Belmont and slightly 
less than those in East Palo Alto.”); City of Pasadena, Housing 
Element 2014–2021, at B-18 (2014) (stating that city’s dedication 
requirements for new subdivisions “are similar to jurisdictions across 
southern California and are not deemed to place a unique cost or actual 
constraints upon the development, improvement, and maintenance of 
housing”), available at https://ww5.cityofpasadena.net/planning/wp-
content/uploads/sites/56/2017/07/Adopted-Housing-Element-2014-02-
04.pdf [https://perma.cc/7377-M325]; City of Mountain View, 2015–
2023 Housing Element 106–10 (2014) (justifying Mountain View’s 
inclusionary-zoning, park-dedication, and impact fees with reference to 
those in nearby cities), available at https://www.mountainview.gov/ 
 civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=15284 [https://perma.cc/C8VP-
VXRV]. 
154. Cf. O’Neill et al., supra note 28, at 49–50 (finding, in study of San 
Francisco Bay Area cities, that every housing project of five or more units 
was subject to discretionary, design-oriented review). 
155. See supra Part III.A. 
156. See supra Part III.B. 
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also be considered. Might the holders of extant development allowances 
eventually coalesce as a powerful new interest group opposed to future 
upzonings and development-allowance auctions?157 
Consider taxi medallions. Professor Katrina Wyman’s study of New 
York City’s canonical medallion regime shows that the regime was not 
created in response to intense lobbying pressure from taxi companies.158 
Medallions were not scarce initially. But as the city’s population and 
economy grew, medallion prices went up, and medallion owners become 
forceful opponents of expanding the medallion supply.159 Mayors 
responded to the fiscal incentive to auction more allowances, but their 
liberalizing forays were mostly beaten back by lobbyists for the 
incumbent medallion owners.160 This story is not unique to New York. 
Medallion-style taxi regimes are common elsewhere, and they are 
generally thought to result in an inefficient shortage of taxi services.161 
It was Uber and Lyft, not cities acting on a fiscal incentive to auction 
more medallions, that finally broke the taxi cartels.162 
Development allowances under our model would be a type of 
regulatory property akin to taxi medallions, although, importantly, 
they would lack some of the characteristics that made medallions so 
conducive to the formation of a supply-restricting cartel. Whereas taxi-
medallion owners had homogeneous interests with respect to the supply 
of new medallions—restrictions raised all of the owners’ incomes and 
asset values—the owners of development allowances would have con–
flicting interests. Builders and developers seeking to secure projects 
would surely be major players in the development-allowance market, 
and their interests would be at war with buy-and-hold investors’.163 
 
157. In New York City, the owner of the TDRs that were issued as part of the 
historic preservation deal unsuccessfully opposed an upzoning of parcels 
in the “receiving zone,” and subsequently brought a taking claim against 
the upzoning, which the city settled (reportedly for a nominal sum). See 
Christopher Serkin, Penn Central Take Two, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
913, 914 (2016). 
158. Katrina Mariam Wyman, Problematic Private Property: The Case of New 
York Taxicab Medallions, 30 Yale J. on Reg. 125, 168–69 (2013). 
159. Id. at 173–77 (documenting the role of incumbent taxi medallion holders 
in blocking mayoral plans to auction additional medallions). 
160. Id. at 177–85. 
161. See id. at 147 n.121 and sources cited therein. 
162. See generally Katrina M. Wyman, Taxi Regulation in the Age of Uber, 20 
N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 1 (2017). To be sure, there were various 
earlier efforts in some cities—some successful—to reduce entry barriers to 
taxi markets through regulatory reform. See Wyman, supra note 158, at 
147 n.121 and sources cited therein. 
163. In the taxi context, only consumers’ interests were opposed to the medallion 
owners’, and consumers were not well organized and did not have 
incentives to organize. See Wyman, supra note 158, at 156–63. 
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Also, whereas taxi medallions were often owned by long-term 
players who built deep relationships with each other and elected 
officials,164 the development allowance market would be more in flux. 
Development allowances, unlike taxi medallions, would produce income 
only when sold or redeemed, and the “interest group” consisting of a 
given upzoned area’s allowance owners would actually be self-
liquidating over time, as development occurs and the associated allow–
ances are redeemed.165 
It was easy for big taxi-medallion investors to put a sympathetic 
face on their lobbying efforts, arguing that issuing new allowances 
would wreck the small independent drivers whose livelihoods depend on 
their medallions.166 But no workers’ livelihoods would depend on 
restricting future upzonings. And whereas cities wielded monopoly 
power over their taxi markets, housing markets are regional; housing in 
one city is a (perhaps imperfect) substitute for housing in a neighboring 
city. 
And yet, none of these distinctions vitiate the basic point that 
restrictions on future upzonings in a region would likely raise the value 
of existing, long-term development allowances, benefiting those 
allowances’ investors-owners. Some investors might form unholy 
alliances with existing NIMBY groups. (On the other hand, the owners 
of upzoned, still-developable parcels of land may have less reason to 
lobby against future upzonings elsewhere in the city or region because 
much of their land’s development value would have been transferred to 
allowance holders.167) 
 
164. See Wyman, supra note 158, at 156–57, 163–64, 174–77 (discussing “large 
fleet owners whose families have owned medallions since the late 1930s 
and 1940s,” organizational costs, and lobbying efforts). 
165. This turnover would make it harder for the owners to organize as a potent 
political force. 
166. Cf. Brian M. Rosenthal, As Thousands of Taxi Drivers Were Trapped in 
Loans, Top Officials Counted the Money, N.Y. Times (May 19, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/19/nyregion/taxi-medallions.html 
[https://perma.cc/8C9F-CLZR] (painting sympathetic portrait of independent 
taxi drivers trapped by debt); Brian M. Rosenthal, Facing Ruin, Taxi 
Drivers to Get $10 Million Break and Loan Safeguards, N.Y. Times (June 
12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/nyregion/nyc-taxi-
medallions.html [https://perma.cc/JAK7-QEHT] (reporting on city initiatives 
to bail out drivers in debt). 
167. The extent to which this is so depends on: (1) the extent to which, under 
the status quo, land value residuals are captured and/or destroyed by 
exactions, fees, and permitting regulations; and (2) the extent to which, 
under the auction regime, the allowances capture the full residual. 
(Because allowance prices would be determined by marginal buyers and 
sellers, the market price of allowances for a zone or tier would not capture 
the full residual for non-marginal parcels in the tier, i.e., those that are 
more valuable to develop / redevelop than the marginal parcels.) 
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In any event, there are various ex ante ways for the auction 
framework’s designers to mitigate the risk of development-allowance 
owners eventually becoming a potent anti-upzoning force. For example, 
the state could set limits on the concentration of allowance holdings, 
particularly holdings by investors who are not themselves developers, 
builders, or owners of parcels in the upzoned area.168 Or, more 
decisively, the state could put strict time limits on the development 
allowances, akin to the several-year fuse that cities often put on the 
entitlements for housing projects.169 If allowances had short lifespans, 
developers and builders with ready-to-go projects would dominate the 
market for allowances, rather than investors who bet on long-term price 
trends connected to the zoning envelope’s future expansion—or lack 
thereof. 
But there are tradeoffs to consider, too. Most notably, short-term 
allowances would probably be less effective for entrenching, and 
rewarding, big upzoning deals. To illustrate, imagine an upzoning that 
removes density limits and increases allowable heights and floor-to-area 
ratios by fifty percent in existing residential neighborhoods throughout 
a large city. If the city auctioned the newly developable square footage 
all at once, and if the development allowances had, say, a three-year 
fuse, the allowances would probably sell for about $0. Allowance prices 
would be extremely low even if it were very profitable to buy up existing 
homes at fair market value and replace them with larger multi-family 
structures. The reason is that many homeowners across the city would 
not want to sell to a developer within the next three years, even at fair 
market value; and in any event, the building industry would probably 
lack the capacity to rebuild all of the city’s residential neighborhoods 
in just three years.170 The marginal development allowance in this 
scenario would therefore be worthless, and because prices in competitive 
markets are set by the marginal buyers and sellers, development 
allowances would trade for almost nothing. 
By contrast, if the same amount of developable space were 
auctioned in the form of perpetual-development allowances, the city 
would probably collect a tidy sum. In the perpetual-allowance world, 
 
168. The goal here is to keep buy-and-hold investors from becoming the 
dominant players in the market. 
169. For a summary of the entitlement periods in Los Angeles, see Fernando 
Villa & Shelby Q. McMahon, Los Angeles Enacts Ordinance to Streamline 
Entitlement Process, Pircher, Nichols, & Meeks LLP (June 5, 2012), 
https://www.pircher.com/insights-publications-94.html [https://perma 
 .cc/V2PM-6U5L]. 
170. Note that staggered allowance auctions also mitigate this problem, but 
that the volume of allowances might still not be sufficient for large projects. 
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bids at the auction would reflect the present value of development far 
into the future.171 
To profit from big upzonings in a world of short-term allowances, 
cities would have to release the associated allowances gradually. Yet if 
local governments auctioned perhaps a year or two’s worth of supply 
at a time, upzoning deals would not be binding at all, at least not by 
virtue of the auction contracts.172 If anti-development forces gained 
control of the city council, they could scale back, or simply halt, the 
upcoming auctions. And regardless of who controls the city council, the 
world of short-term allowances would invite on-going bickering over 
how much developable space to release each year. The pressures that 
cities now face about whether to adjust a legislated exaction or fee 
schedule would return,173 but in a slightly different guise: the decision 
would be about quantity (how much more of the envelope to auction 
this year), rather than price (whether to raise or lower the fees and 
exactions).174 
To acknowledge these problems is not to say that the short-term-
allowance world would be just as bad as the status quo.175 The short-
 
171. Winning bidders would resell some of their allowances to builders today, 
while banking the rest in the expectation that they will be worth more in 
the future, as space within the expanded zoning envelope is gradually used 
up. 
172. The auction contract might specify procedures for permitting of projects 
entitled with the use of the development allowances that the winning 
bidders acquired, but it is hard to see how the contract could commit the 
city to auctioning additional developable space in the future. Even if the 
contract had such a term, the city could breach it at will, since the owner 
of an existing development allowance would not suffer any damages 
(indeed, would likely benefit) from the city electing not to make available 
additional developable space in the future. 
173. See supra Part I.C. 
174. One can also imagine all sorts of dubious public efforts to time the market, 
with cities downsizing their auctions whenever housing prices fall. 
175. The world of short-term allowances would have a number of the auction-
framework advantages we have discussed. It would allow cities to extract 
more site value without the risk of overshooting and inadvertently 
deterring development (because markets, not politicians, would set the 
price). See supra Parts I.C, II.A. It would make cities bear the cost of 
pointlessly convoluted and discretionary permitting regimes. See supra 
Part III.A. It would provide state regulators with much-needed 
information about whether the development capacity a city claims to have 
made available is realistically available. See supra Part III.B. And it would 
obviate the need for pointless “nexus” studies. 
 Moreover, the state could empower the political coalition behind a major 
upzoning to commit to future allowance auctions using state 
administrative law, regardless of the allowances’ duration. The auction-
enabling statute might provide that if a local government, in a state-
approved plan, promises to auction at least x square feet of a specified 
zoning envelope annually for a defined period of time, then the state 
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term model has certain advantages; the long-term model has others.176 
We remain agnostic about development allowances’ optimal duration. 
It may also be possible to forestall the emergence of political alliances 
between NIMBYs and owners of long-term development allowances by 
creating a class of development allowances whose owners would be 
entitled to a portion of any additional allowances created by future 
upzonings. Rick Hills and David Schleicher have sketched a version of 
this idea for TDR programs.177 Obviously there are downsides to it as 
 
agency may conduct those auctions on the local government’s behalf 
under the approved plan’s terms. The state-approved plan would preempt 
any downzoning or permitting restrictions to the contrary that a later city 
council might adopt. If the plan is locked in through a state administrative 
approval that preempts contrary local regulations, then pro-housing 
actors will be able to get a court order specifically enforcing the plan 
(assuming the state statute so provides). By contrast, a party, such as an 
owner of development allowances, who claims breach of a contract with a 
local government normally can obtain only reliance damages. See Serkin, 
supra note 95, at 916–17, 957–59 (noting that “development agreements” 
that state statutes expressly authorized often enable the developer to get 
specific performance against a local government, in contrast to the reliance 
damages typically available for governmental breaches of a contract). 
176. To summarize: The long-term model provides stronger fiscal incentives 
for big upzonings with big (large number of allowance) auctions, by 
allowing the local government to capture future development value in the 
present. It also enables the local government to substantially lock in the 
terms of that upzoning through allowance contracts. Finally, the long-
term model should improve the flow of information to state regulators 
about particular development constraints, as it would create arbitrage 
opportunities for investors who locate constraints, buy inexpensive 
allowances, then prevail upon the state agency or courts to remove the 
constraints, and finally resell their allowances at a profit. The main 
advantages of the short-term model are that it will not create a “buy and 
hold” investor class opposed to future upzoning, and it is less prone to 
certain transaction-cost problems that may occur after most of the long-
term allowances for a zone have been redeemed. See infra Part IV.C. 
 Perhaps it is also worth noting that the long-term model might tempt 
some local governments to commit to allowing a lot of development in the 
future, while depriving future city councils of sources of revenue for 
associated infrastructure (e.g., by writing into the auction contract that 
no fee or exaction may be charged as a condition of project approval). We 
are not much concerned about this, however, as the auction market would 
provide an automatic check: the local government’s failure to plan for and 
finance needed infrastructure would reduce what bidders offer of the 
allowances. Also, the state agency that approves the auction plan could 
require the local government to set aside a reasonable portion of the 
revenue for capital needs. 
177. Hills & Schleicher, Building Coalitions Out of Thin Air, supra note 25, at 
116-17 (proposing “constant ratio” TDRs that would provide a bonus 
defined with reference to base zoning; as base-zoning changes, so too 
would the amount of additional height and density that could be built by 
redeeming the TDR). 
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well, such as reduced flexibility for future politicians to allocate the 
surplus from future upzonings in the most expedient manner. 
The bottom line is that figuring out the best possible structure for 
a regime of upzoning with auctions will require some trial and error. 
B. Transaction Costs and the Allowance Endgame 
Another objection to our proposal is that it introduces new 
transaction costs into the development stream. In the auction world, 
developers must not only assemble suitable parcels of land for their 
projects, but also purchase the requisite allowances. If the allowance 
market were liquid and competitive, this additional step would not 
squander resources. Allowances would just be one more construction 
input that the developer must buy, like steel or lumber, and the cost 
would be similarly easy to budget for. But if the allowance market were 
thin, with just a few transactions annually and a small number of 
players, the transaction costs of assembling the necessary allowances 
for a project could become significant. Development-allowance deals 
would start to look more like land-assembly deals, with strategic 
behavior and considerable ex ante uncertainty about what it will take 
to get the deal done. 
There are many ways for a state agency that reviews auction plans 
to mitigate this problem. The agency could reject plans that would 
distribute only a small number of allowances for some tiers or zones. It 
could also set “minimum square footages” for allowance holdings, 
disallowing the subdivision of allowances into bundles too small to 
license a typical project in the zone.178 But eventually most of the 
allowances in a tier will have been redeemed, and at that point the 
market will be less than competitive. To keep transaction costs from 
spiraling, the state might stipulate that all development allowances are 
subject to a call option that would take effect when the number of 
allowance holders falls below some threshold, allowing developers with 
an approved project to force a sale of allowances at either their fair 
market value or at the project’s estimated residual value.179 The point 
is not to get the price just right through a complicated public procedure, 
but to create a simple mechanism for forced transfers that will dissuade 
holdout behavior by the last few allowance owners. 
The state could also mitigate the end-game problem by making 
allowances time limited. This is tantamount to a penalty default: if an 
allowance owner failed to transfer her allowances to developers with 
ready-to-go projects before the end of an allowance cycle, her allowances 
 
178. There could be an exception allowing owners of small parcels to acquire 
the number of allowances needed for their site. 
179. Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1399 (2004) 
(exploring the use of option contracts to mitigate transaction-cost 
problems resulting from uncertainty about private valuations). 
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would become worthless.180 A city could mitigate end-game transaction 
costs by further upzoning the area in question and selling additional 
allowances whenever a zone’s market becomes thin.181 
Though end-game transaction costs are a concern under the auction 
model, it is important to keep the big picture in view. This is only an 
end-game problem, assuming each tier has many allowances initially. 
The limited public role that may be needed to facilitate low-transaction-
cost transfers during end-game times should be much less 
administratively taxing than the never-ending pressures to recalibrate 
fees and exactions under the legislated-schedule model for value 
capture, let alone the hassles of negotiating case-by-case development 
agreements. For most end-game projects, allowance assembly will take 
place privately, with little fuss, having been negotiated in the shadow 
of a possible forced sale or penalty default. 
C. Upzoning Vetopoints 
Another objection to our proposal is that it would give the state an 
effective veto over local upzoning.182 Although the housing agency 
would lack authority to block local upzoning ordinances, the agency’s 
denial of an associated plan to auction allowances might cause the local 
government to rescind or delay its upzoning in the hope of getting 
approval for upzoning with auctions at a later date. Anticipating as 
much, interest groups that favor restrictive housing policies would 
lobby the agency to reject auction plans. 
While we cannot rule out such scenarios, the risks must be weighed 
against both the dangers of the status quo and the risks of strategic 
downzoning, or worse, the use of auction contracts to entrench NIMBY 
 
180. As discussed previously, supra Part IV.A, short-term allowances are also 
less likely to generate a new anti-upzoning political force in the form of 
allowance owners. 
181. This assumes that the new allowances and the old allowances would be 
fungible for use within both the expanded zoning envelope created at time 
1 (in connection with the first auction, and the yet-further-expanded 
zoning envelope created at time 2 (in connection with the second auction). 
In anticipation of possible end-game issues, the allowance contracts 
written for the first auction should allow for this. The first-auction 
contracts should, however, probably disallow the issuance of new 
allowances that would be merely dilutive of existing allowances, i.e., new 
allowances for use within the time-1 envelope that do not also license 
development in some further-expanded (time 2) envelope on the same 
sites. 
182. See Fischel, supra note 30, at 54–55 (noting that many state interventions 
in the land-use space have had a “double veto” character, giving 
development opponents a new forum in which to block projects, while 
doing nothing to help proponents get socially-beneficial projects approved). 
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policies in a world where local governments could auction development 
allowances without state approval.183 
In today’s high-cost, supply-constrained metropolitan regions, some 
further inducement is clearly necessary to get local governments to meet 
the demand for new housing. The interests that oppose dense residential 
development at the local level—homeowners and neighborhood 
groups—are not as well organized at the state level. Business interests, 
which are well represented in state capitals, have a strong incentive to 
lobby for pro-housing policies.184 
On balance, we think the risk of the state housing agency being 
captured by antidevelopment interests pales in comparison to the 
dangers of the status quo, in which city council members who clog the 
development pipeline are rewarded by neighborhood constituents.185 
That said, a state policymaker who disagrees with our judgment 
about relative risks might consider a more limited, targeted version of 
our proposal, in which the only development rights that cities could 
auction would be those created by a state statute that directly upzone 
 
183. E.g., by promising through the auction contract not to upzone other 
parcels in the future. 
184. Increases in the regional housing supply will help businesses to recruit 
more workers, and to the extent that housing-supply increases bring down 
housing prices, they will raise the effective wage (purchasing power) paid 
to a business’s workers at no cost to the business. See Marisa Kendall, 
Stripe Gives $1 Million to Pro-Development YIMBY Group Tackling Bay 
Area Housing Shortage, San Jose Mercury News (May 3, 2013), 
https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/05/03/pro-development-yimby-group-
scores-1-million-from-stripe-tackle-housing-shortage/ [https://perma.cc/ 
 3JKR-965V] (describing how tech companies invest in housing to enable 
employees to live near their office, reduce commute times, and improve 
overall quality of life). 
 It could be objected that these business interests themselves represent a 
powerful constituency capable of capturing state lawmakers and 
propelling them to advance a different set of parochial interests. See 
Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public 
Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 959, 
988 (1991) (observing that public choice theory does not offer clear 
prediction which level of government is more susceptible to interest-group 
capture). Without doubt, the state should not be seen naively as a white 
knight, and, over the long run, assuming significant mitigation of the 
current crisis, we acknowledge that the balance on housing policy might 
swing back to localities. But, for the moment, given the intensity of the 
crisis and its impact on constituencies better able to influence policy at 
the state level, we think it is an easy call to support a shift to the state. 
185. One might think that the developers would push local governments for 
streamlined permitting, but politically connected developers benefit from 
cumbersome, discretionary processes that cut out their competitors. See 
O’Neill et al., supra note 28, at 75 (“Our interview data confirms that 
well-capitalized developers with existing relationships and experience in 
specific jurisdictions are the best situated to navigate these complex local 
[development permitting regimes].”) (emphasis added). 
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certain areas that local governments have traditionally resisted 
developing, such as existing residential neighborhoods near transit.186 
On the other hand, this more limited version of our proposal may result 
in a thinner, less competitive market in development allowances, and 
some cities might delay voluntary upzoning outside of the state-
upzoned areas with the goal of later winning legislative authorization 
to couple the contemplated upzoning with an auction. 
D. Cities with Market Power 
Still another objection to our model is that large cities are not price 
takers when it comes to housing. If they allow lots of development, 
housing prices decrease; if they allow very little development, prices 
stay high. Fiscally minded zoning by cities with market power will 
therefore yield an inefficiently low quantity of housing, just as any other 
monopolist produces too little of the good they have monopolized.187 
This is a legitimate concern, but in our view the important question 
is not whether big cities would allow less than an optimal amount of 
housing, but rather whether they would allow more housing than they 
do now. Consider again our San Francisco example. The city surely has 
some market power. If San Francisco tripled its housing production, 
housing prices in the city would probably come down somewhat. But 
even if prices fell by a couple hundred dollars per square foot, the city 
could still reap enormous sums from the allowance auctions.188 Whether 
the city faces a flat demand curve (the price-taker scenario), or a 
downward-sloping demand curve (the market-power scenario), we are 
confident that local political entrepreneurs looking to capture and 
redistribute the land-value residual would push for large-scale 
upzonings if the city could auction the newly developable space. 
We also think the appeal of a go-slow, do-not-upzone-too-much-
lest-prices-fall strategy may be undercut by competition among the 
jurisdictions in a metropolitan region. To continue with our running 
example, housing units in Oakland, Berkeley, Mountain View, and 
other Bay Area municipalities are substitutes, albeit imperfect, for 
housing units in San Francisco. The demand curve for housing in San 
Francisco therefore depends on the amount of housing that all the other 
Bay Area jurisdictions have already produced, as well as how much 
housing they are expected to produce in the future. The regional nature 
of housing markets means that in the auction world, each jurisdiction 
 
186. Thanks to David Schleicher for offering this suggestion. 
187. Fischel, supra note 30, at 272, 277. 
188. At housing prices of $1,150 per square foot, we ballparked the per-square-
foot residual at (0.8*$1150) – (2*$350 - $70) = $430, or $2.15 billion for 
5,000 homes of 1,000 square feet each. At $950 per square foot, the total 
residual for 5,000 homes would be about $1.35 billion. 
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would benefit from being the first jurisdiction in its region to 
substantially upzone and auction allowances.189 
Epistemic uncertainties probably cut against the go-slow strategy 
as well. Economists have shown that demand curves for housing can 
only be estimated by making strong, basically unverifiable assump–
tions.190 Projections of future housing-demand curves in the post-
auction world would be even shakier, requiring serious guesswork about 
how the supply of substitute housing in nearby jurisdictions will change 
in response to the new fiscal incentive to upzone. So long as allowances 
continue to fetch prices high enough to finance the goods or transfers 
that hold the pro-development coalition together, we think most cities 
(uncertain of the future, and wary of losing a possible early-mover 
advantage) would enact prospective upzonings as quickly as possible, 
rather than delaying with the hope of securing a better price for later 
development allowances. 
In principle, state lawmakers could check the market power of big 
cities by devolving the rezoning-and-auction decision to neighborhood-
level entities.191 Neighborhood-level decision-makers would be closer to 
pure price takers, as there are good substitutes for most neighborhoods, 
and no one neighborhood could much affect the regional housing supply. 
But neighborhood-level institutions would probably be even more 
homeowner-dominated than city councils. And, needless to say, cities 
would fight mightily against any state initiative to shift rezoning 
authority from city governments to new neighborhood-level insti–
tutions. 
E. Do Local Politicians Prefer In-Kind Exactions? 
This is less an objection than a question about whether the local 
right to auction development allowances, if created, would be widely 
used. Professor Rachelle Alterman has studied land-value-capture 
practices around the world, and one of her principal conclusions is that 
indirect modes of value capture are much more common than overt 
 
189. The size of the first mover advantage will depend on the degree of 
uncertainty about future production throughout the region. If market 
participants are very confident that prices will come crashing down in the 
future, they will not pay a lot for allowances today. 
190. See generally Saku Aura & Thomas Davidoff, Supply Constraints and 
Housing Prices, 99 Econ. Letters 275 (2008). 
191. Some scholars envision rezoning occurring through a joint decision by 
homeowners in a neighborhood to sell their properties to a developer. See 
Nelson, supra note 24, 178–79. Japan apparently has a procedure whereby 
two-thirds of the landowners in an area can petition for rezoning for higher 
FAR, and the local government is required to act on the petition within 
six months. Sorenson et al., supra note 109, at 570. We do not know 
whether it is widely used. 
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taxation of the surplus.192 She reports that, of the industrialized nations, 
only Poland, the United Kingdom, and Israel have provided for benefit 
taxes (special assessments) on upzoning’s value.193 And to the best of 
our knowledge, only Brazil has authorized cities to auction development 
allowances in connection with upzoning—and Brazil requires the 
auction proceeds to be spent, like a benefit tax, on services for the 
upzoned area.194 By contrast, the in-kind exactions, impact fees, 
development agreements, and incentive-zoning ordinances now in favor 
among U.S. municipalities have near counterparts around the world.195 
Might we have overlooked some real advantage of these indirect 
modes of value exaction? Relative to benefit taxation, the indirect 
methods clearly do have advantages: they will not raise the ire of 
liquidity-constrained landowners, and they don’t require a public 
agency to accurately forecast the value conferred by upzoning. But 
these advantages are shared by our auction model. 
Another political attraction of in-kind value capture is that it may 
allow local officials to more credibly commit to spending the value 
extracted for certain purposes down the road.196 To illustrate, imagine 
that affordable-housing advocates have strong allies on a city council 
that is considering an upzoning plan. If the council pairs the upzoning 
with a below-market-rate-housing requirement, it is more likely that 
the upzoning will continue to yield affordable housing units years into 
the future than if land-value residuals were extracted in cash for the 
general fund. Though a future city council could repeal the below-
market-rate requirement, the political transaction costs of doing so 
would likely exceed the transaction costs of reducing general-fund 
appropriations for affordable housing.197 Nothing intrinsic to our model, 
however, requires auction revenues to be deposited in the general fund. 
 
192. Rachelle Alterman, Land Use Regulations and Property Values: The 
“Windfalls Capture” Idea Revisited, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Urban Economics and Planning 755, 775 (Nancy Brooks et al. eds., 
2012). 
193. Id. at 768. 
194. For reviews of the Brazilian experience, see Suzuki et al., supra note 
101, at 215–16; Paulo Sandroni, A New Financial Instrument of Value 
Capture in São Paulo: Certificates of Additional Construction Potential, 
in Municipal Revenues and Land Policies (Gregory K. Ingram & Yu-
Hung Hong eds., 2010); Kim, supra note 92, at 4. 
195. Alterman, supra note 192. 
196. Thanks to John Infranca for suggesting this point. 
197. The municipal budget comes up for negotiation automatically every year 
or two, and these negotiations provide lots of opportunities for horse-
trading, whereas repealing a BMR requirement would require opponents 
of the program to get their repeal measure onto the legislative agenda and 
then overcome the various forms of status-quo bias that are built into the 
legislative process (e.g., committee and mayoral veto points). 
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We think many local governments would want to commit some portion 
of the revenue to capital projects, and if other spending commitments 
are reasonably necessary to hold the pro-development coalition 
together, the state agency that approves the auction plan should let the 
local government make these commitments.198 The commitments, once 
approved by the agency, could become enforceable as a matter of state 
law,199 thereby allowing city councils to make more credible spending 
commitments through auctions than with in-kind public-benefit 
schedules. 
Indirect value capture may also appeal to politicians who want to 
divide the upzoning pie in a manner that the public would regard as 
unfair. When upzoning’s value is divvied up discreetly and in kind, 
politicians may be able to divert more of that value to big campaign 
donors and powerful interest groups than if value extraction were 
transparent. But the Brazilian experience suggests that if cities receive 
authority to auction the developable space created by upzoning, they 
will use it eagerly.200 Brazilian cities jumped on board even though 
Brazil’s capital markets were not well developed, and despite tight 
restrictions on the use of auction proceeds.201 In the U.S., which has 
well-developed capital markets and experience with other forms of 
tradeable regulatory property, we expect an even more enthusiastic 
reception than in Brazil. 
F. Would the Auctions Be Unlawful? 
So far we have considered functional objections to our proposal, but 
one might also wonder whether the auction model is simply foreclosed 
by the Takings Clause, or perhaps by one of the various tax limitations 
found in states’ constitutions. 
We have noted that the Supreme Court’s Takings-Clause juris–
prudence imposes a nexus-and-proportionality requirement on property 
exactions and fees.202 Under our proposal, the price of development 
 
198. Our model does not require that localities foreswear development fees or 
in-kind exactions, but forces the locality to internalize the costs of these 
decisions. If a city retains the right to charge fees, and on a discretionary 
basis, then this would reduce the value of the allowances. However, if a 
city does give up fees, then prudence requires that it save a portion of its 
allowance revenue for needed infrastructure. A middle road could be to 
create a prudent capital fund from allowance revenues. 
199. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
200. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. The City of San Paulo has 
already raised nearly $2.8 billion with development rights auctions and 
further auctions are in the offing. See Kim, supra note 92, at 8. 
201. See Kim, supra note 92, at 4 (describing geographic and other limitations 
on the use of auction proceeds); id. at 32 (comparing capital markets in 
Brazil and the U.S.). 
202. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020 
Auctioning the Upzone 
566 
allowances would be roughly proportional to the market value of new 
housing, rather than to infrastructure needs or injuries attributable to 
development. It might therefore be said that requiring landowners to 
redeem allowances as a condition of receiving development permits is 
unconstitutional. 
This argument should fail, however, because the nexus-and-
proportionality requirement is best understood as governing only 
discretionary conditions on development permits.203 Under the auction 
model, the requirement that landowners redeem allowances to build 
above the development baseline would be mandatory, and simple math 
would determine the number of allowances for a given project. 
This is not sophistry. Discretionary conditions are particularly 
susceptible to favoritism and abuse. The courts that have complained 
about local governments’ extortionate behavior should welcome our 
proposal, for as we have seen, ours would actually encourage local 
governments to curtail their own discretion, establishing clear-cut 
standards and speedy procedures for project review. 
The doctrinal line between discretionary and nondiscretionary 
conditions is needed to keep the exactions jurisprudence from 
swallowing numerous precedents that apply deferential standards of 
review to everyday taxes and regulations. Property taxation has never 
faced a congruence-and-proportionality requirement, and even special 
assessments, which can vary from one parcel to the next, are reviewed 
deferentially.204 As we explain below, the development-allowance 
auction is akin to a special assessment on upzoning, but with built-in 
protections for liquidity-constrained landowners and safeguards against 
“overshooting,” i.e., taxing away more value than was actually 
conferred. The precedents that give local governments a wide berth for 
benefit taxation counsel for acceptance of the auction model too. 
Or consider economic regulation. Zoning and other limits on 
economic activity can become a taking in when they go too far, but the 
Constitution doesn’t require nexus-and-proportionality studies as a 
matter of course when governments enact pollution controls. Nor does 
a state’s decision to control pollution by creating new forms of 
regulatory property, such greenhouse-gas emission allowances, trigger 
special Takings scrutiny. An auctioned right to build pursuant to an 
upzoning plan is just another form of regulatory property. 
We acknowledge, though, that at least one justice of the Supreme 
Court, Justice Thomas, seems inclined to extend the nexus-and-pro–
 
203. As the California Supreme Court put it, “[t]he ‘sine qua non’ for 
application of Nollan/Dolan scrutiny is . . . the ‘discretionary deployment 
of the police power’ in ‘the imposition of land-use conditions in individual 
cases.’” San Remo Hotel v. City & Cty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 
2002). See also Bldg. Indus. Ass’n—Bay Area v. City of Oakland, 289 F. 
Supp. 3d 1056, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
204. See, e.g., Houck v. Little River Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 254, 265 (1915). 
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portionality requirement to nondiscretionary development conditions.205 
If nothing else, we think our framework would offer a good set of facts 
to test Justice Thomas’s intuitions. Our proposal highlights what 
should be the real focus of the takings inquiry in cases about 
nondiscretionary exactions: the definition of the development baseline, 
not the conditions placed on development in excess of that baseline.206 
Our proposal also draws attention to the very strong state interests 
that can be served by allowing local governments to profit from relaxed 
land-use controls, and to the pervasiveness and diversity of 
contemporary value capture practices. 
The auctions might also be challenged on state-constitutional 
takings or tax-limitation grounds. A state-by-state analysis is beyond 
the scope of this Article. For now, we simply note that California’s 
requirements for raising revenue are particularly fearsome; yet even in 
California, the state could likely authorize upzoning auctions without 
amending the state constitution.207 
 
205. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S.Ct. 928, 928–29 
(2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in cert. denial). 
206. See generally Fischel, supra note 80. 
207. Proposition 13 strictly limits property taxes and imposes a supermajority 
requirement for most other kinds of taxes. Cal. Const. art. XIIIA, § 1. 
Proposition 218 limits, among other things, the imposition of “fees” as an 
“incident of property ownership” or for a “property-related service.” Id. 
art. XIIID. Proposition 26 constrains any government charge for any other 
kind of public service. Id. art. XIIIC, §§ 1(e), 2. A challenge to 
development-allowance auctions in California grounded on some 
combination of these restrictions would be likely, but we do not think it 
would succeed. 
 For starters, the allowances, though related to property value, are not 
themselves a tax imposed on property value and therefore would not run 
afoul of Proposition 13’s limitation on property taxes. See, e.g., Neilson 
v. City of California City, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) 
(parcel taxes are not ad valorem property taxes). Further, the allowances 
are not a fee charged for governmental services, and so they are not likely 
to fall under Proposition 218; that is, the auction allowances are not like 
paying for garbage pickup. One might worry that Proposition 218’s notion 
of an “incident of property ownership” might be interpreted broadly so as 
to include the allowances. The California Supreme Court, however, has 
already held that this does not extend to voluntary decisions to develop 
one’s property. Richmond v. Shasta Cmty. Servs. Dist., 83 P.3d 518, 526 
(Cal. 2004). 
 Proposition 26, the sweeping catchall, does at first glance restrict “any 
levy, charge or exaction,” yet it specifically excepts “a charge imposed as 
a condition of property development.” Cal. Const. art. XIIIC, § 1(e)(6). 
Tradeable development allowances fall squarely within this exception. 
While the analogous proviso in Proposition 218 preserved only “existing 
laws relating to the imposition of fees or charges as a condition of property 
development,” id. art. XIIID, § 1(b), Proposition 26’s exception has no 
such temporal limitation. The tradeable development allowance, as a 
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G. Would the Auctions Be Unjust? 
Setting aside the finer, doctrinal points, might there be some more 
basic, normative objection? Perhaps yes, if the development baseline 
were set significantly below the typical density of developed parcels in 
the jurisdiction, or far below the buildable envelope allowed under 
longstanding zoning classifications.208 But requiring the purchase of 
development allowances by landowners who want to use the expanded 
zoning envelope created or induced by a change in state law does not 
deprive them of anything to which they might reasonably have felt 
entitled. 
The airwave spectrum offers an instructive analogy. Congress 
required television broadcasters to switch to digital signals in 2009.209 
This freed up the broadcast spectrum’s valuable, low-frequency bands, 
which wireless phone carriers were eager to use. One might suppose 
that, because they had previously used it, television stations owned the 
low-frequency spectrum. But with the advent of digital broadcasting, 
they no longer needed it, and Congress saw fit to allocate the freed-up 
spectrum by auction.210 Just as technological changes and regulatory 
mandates have made certain airwave spectrums newly available, the 
buildable area created by state-induced upzoning is essentially a new 
resource. The fortuity of owning land within the upzoned area no more 
entitles landowners to the surplus than did the fortuity of broadcasting 
over a particular portion of the spectrum entitle television stations to 
reap the wireless windfall. 
Another way of thinking about the fairness issue is by analogy to 
special-benefit assessments (a form of benefit taxation). Consider a 
property owner who has purchased a single-family home not far from a 
transit stop. This homeowner did not buy the home to serve as a rental, 
much less was she speculating about a zoning change. She bought the 
home to live in herself at the market clearing-price of, say, $300,000. 
Now suppose that a state or local government, having only glanced at 
the first paragraphs of this Article, upzones all property near transit 
 
novel sort of “charge imposed as a condition of property development,” is 
therefore on safe ground. 
 Even if a court were to conclude that auctioning the upzone is subject to 
Proposition 26, that would not kill the idea. Local governments would 
just have to put their auction programs to a pre-implementation vote of 
the municipal electorate. 
208. Hence our suggestion to define the development baseline as the greater of 
(1) the zoning of the parcel as of the date of the auction-authorizing state 
statute, or (2) the median density of already-developed parcels in the 
jurisdiction as of the same date. 
209. DTV Delay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-4, 123 Stat. 122 (2009) (establishing a 
transition date of June 12, 2009). 
210. Jeffrey A. Hart, The Transition to Digital Television in the United States: 
The Endgame, 1 Int’l J. Digital Television 7, 21–22, 25 (2010). 
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stops. Our homeowner’s lot is actually large enough for a small 
apartment building. Given the pent-up demand for housing, those 
apartments would demand a premium and so, very soon after the state 
law is passed, a developer offers our homeowner $1,000,000 for her 
home. 
Where did this $700,000 windfall come from? It was not a result of 
any investments that were made in the single-family house, nor was it 
the result of superlative work the developer may do in the future to 
earn a sizable premium on the apartments she builds. Indeed, the 
developer, if she knows her business, only offered $1,000,000 because 
she knew she could afford to make this payment and still expect to 
make acceptable profits, given the risk she is bearing. The $700,000 
emerged because of a change in public regulation (zoning) that allowed 
the property’s value to more fully reflect the value of other public 
improvements, such as to the transit system. 
Now suppose there was no public transit stop in this neighborhood, 
just a collection of single-family homes worth, on average, $300,000. 
The city then decides to build a transit system and to upzone the lots 
nearby. Suddenly, all of the homeowners do not own $300,000 homes, 
they own $1,000,000 homes. This $700,000 is a windfall from public 
investment and should be publicly dispersed (at least in significant 
part). Indeed, it is standard—and best—practice to impose a special 
assessment on properties near transit stops before the project is built, 
leveraging the projected windfall to make the transit investment in the 
first place. Suppose this new transit stop will cost $10,000,000 and the 
projected windfall to neighboring properties, collectively, is $5,000,000. 
If special assessments worth $5,000,000 are imposed on the land, then 
other taxpayers need to contribute only $5,000,000. 
This is not only a fair and efficient outcome, but, given resource 
and political constraints, it might be the only way to get the project 
funded. A leading economic historian has argued persuasively that the 
advent of benefit taxation was transformative for economic 
development.211 If a major canal was only going to benefit one portion 
of the state, how could the taxpayers of the entire state be expected to 
fund it? Utilizing value capture was the key; it was efficient, it was fair, 
and it broke a political impasse.212 
Upzoning-with-auctions is close kin to benefit taxation, but with 
two significant equitable advantages for current landowners.213 One is 
 
211. See John Joseph Wallis, Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption: 
American States and Constitutional Change 1842 to 1852, 65 J. Econ. 
Hist. 211, 235 (2005). 
212. Id. at 213, 222, 235. 
213. Cf. George E. Peterson, The World Bank, Unlocking Land 
Values to Finance Urban Infrastructure 37–38 (2009) (“Although 
the concept of betterment levies is straightforward, implementation under 
modern conditions has been unexpectedly difficult.”), available at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/723411468139800644/pdf/46
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the built-in limitation on overshooting, that is, extracting more value 
than is actually conveyed. In the traditional special-assessment case, 
the local government must assign some number, prospectively, to each 
parcel’s expected increase in value. This is hard to do. The typical way 
to proceed is to start with studies that demonstrate, by means of 
regressions, the additional value similar transit projects generated for 
nearby properties, and then argue why these results should be 
replicated in this case. We do not doubt the robust findings that show 
value added as a result of public improvement,214 but it is also well 
understood that this is, necessarily, an inexact science.215 
Even if a proposed special assessment does not overshoot, it may 
stir up strong opposition from liquidity-constrained homeowners.216 An 
assessment is a fixed charge on a parcel of land based on an increase in 
value that owner-occupants will not have realized as cash flow. That a 
home near an improved transit system is now worth more doesn’t mean 
that the pensioner who owns it can afford the special assessment. In 
short, traditional-benefit taxation requires a difficult judgment call on 
valuation and compounds that difficulty with a liquidity problem for 
many taxpayers. 
The auction mechanism solves these problems. Obviously, only 
investors with the resources to bid will participate, so there is no 
imposition of a new obligation on liquidity-constrained landowners. 
Further, if the market is working, allowance transfers will be voluntary 
and no one will pay more than they think the allowances are worth. Of 
course, the price of the development allowances will reflect not only 
value contributed by public investment in transit, parks, and other 




214. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Smith & Thomas A. Gihring, Financing Transit 
Systems Through Value Capture: An Annotated Bibliography, 65 Am. J. 
Econ. & Soc. 751, 751 (2006) (showing that “the elevated value effects 
of transit access are well documented.”). 
215. Susan S. Fainstein, Land Value Capture and Justice, in Value Capture 
and Land Policies 21, 23–24 (Gregory K. Ingram & Yu-Hung Hong 
eds., 2012); Philip A. Booth, The Unearned Increment: Property and the 
Capture of Benefit Value in Britain and France, in Value Capture and 
Land Policies, supra, at 74, 89–90 (summing up disappointing English 
and French experience). But note that there are numerous case studies of 
the successful use of value capture, see Peterson, supra note 213, and so 
we are certainly not suggesting that value capture is not a vital and 
effective tool, just one with limits. For a framework for use of benefit 
assessments, see Darien Shanske, Clearing Away Roadblocks to Funding 
California Infrastructure, 54 State Tax Notes 567 (2009). 
216. Note that John Stuart Mill argued for using value capture and, at different 
points, the United Kingdom attempted to capture value from upzoning 
quite ambitiously, although each of these attempts ended in retreat. See 
Booth, supra note 215, at 77–80. 
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development value created by agglomerations of private enterprises and 
individuals. Yet it is not clear why a site’s owner has any greater claim 
to that value, as a matter of justice or fairness, than does the general 
public.217 So long as the development baseline is reasonably defined, any 
value above the baseline is just a windfall. 
Conclusion 
The public auction is a familiar and effective device for allocating 
publicly owned resources to high-value users while ensuring that the 
public receives a fair (market) price for its resource. The developable 
space that could be created by an upzoning plan is a public resource in 
all but name. Local governments, which control this resource, nowadays 
expect cash and other benefits when they make this resource available 
to private developers. This Article has argued that the states should 
recognize this expressly and authorize local governments to auction the 
amount of buildable space created by an upzoning plan. 
Our argument is a pragmatic one. By authorizing local governments 
to auction the upzone, states should be able to get high-cost, 
supply-constrained cities to allow substantially more housing. The 
framework we have sketched would give local governments a strong 
fiscal incentive to allow dense development in high-value locations, and 
to streamline development-permitting regimes. The framework would 
also generate a policymaking asymmetry within local governments, 
making it comparatively easy for local factions whose policy preferences 
align with state goals to entrench their policies. Finally, the framework 
would help state keep tabs on the amount of buildable space that is 
realistically available for development within municipalities. Local 
governments would have a fiscal incentive to not overclaim about the 
development capacity created by their upzoning plans; and low prices 
for development allowances (relative to the price of finished housing) 
would signal the existence of serious development constraints. 
We encourage legal scholars and state policymakers to think of 
auctioning the upzone as one arrow in a quiver of policies for inducing 
increased residential density in cities. This strategy could be paired with 
state bills that directly upzone certain priority locations, such as sites 
near transit (and it may to help soften opposition to such bills).218 It 
 
217. Cf. John Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 
83 Yale L.J. 75, 127 (1973) (arguing for transferable development rights 
programs, in part on the ground that “the development potential of 
private property is in part a community asset allocable to serve the 
community’s needs”). 
218. California state senator Scott Wiener’s S.B. 50, which would have 
required local governments to allow four- to five-story buildings near 
transit stops, was drafted to give economically disadvantaged “sensitive 
communities” a grace period to come into compliance. See Matt R. 
Richardson, SB 50: Defining Sensitive Communities, Medium (Apr. 15, 
2019), https://medium.com/dialogue-and-discourse/sb-50-defining-sensitive-
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could be deployed alongside measures to strengthen planning 
mandates,219 such as California’s housing element law, or measures to 
tie transportation funding to housing production.220 Upzone auctioning 
could be supplemented with direct subsidies for increased residential 
density, such as grant funding,221 or, in states like California that have 
functioning carbon markets, offsets for local governments to sell on the 
carbon market.222 Alone or in combination with other tools, auctioning 
the upzone has the not insignificant virtue that cities are not likely to 
resist it. 
 
communities-d33e1988e2f8 [https://perma.cc/KRW4-87T9]. Professor Eric 
Biber has helpfully suggested that our auction model could be combined 
with an S.B. 50-like intervention, with a proviso giving sensitive 
communities control over expenditure of auction revenues. Note also that 
one of the principal lines of attack on state upzoning-near-transit bills has 
been that they represent giveaways to developers. See, e.g., Tim 
Redmond, Hearing on Wiener Housing Bill Points to the Roots of This 
Crisis, 48Hills (Mar. 12, 2018), https://48hills.org/2018/03/hearing-
wiener-housing-bill-points-roots-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/WF5N-ZC2T]. 
This criticism would lose all force if local governments were authorized to 
auction the newly developable space. 
219. See generally Elmendorf, supra note 15. 
220. Cf. Laura Bliss, California’s New Governor Would Punish Cities Over 
Affordable Housing, Citylab (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.citylab.com/ 
 transportation/2019/01/gavin-newsom-housing-reform-transportation-
budget-homeless/580192/ [https://perma.cc/79R8-XRQZ] (discussing 
Governor Newsom’s since-abandoned plan to tie local transportation 
funding to housing production); Cecile Murray & Jenny Schuetz, Is 
California’s Apartment Market Broken? 13 (2019) (recommending 
that state policymakers tie transportation and other funding to housing 
production), available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
 2019/07/20190711_metro_Is-California-Apartment-Market-Broken-Schuetz-
Murray.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQJ4-8CAS]. 
221. Cf. Madeline Carlisle, Elizabeth Warren’s Ambitious Fix for America’s 
Housing Crisis, The Atlantic (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.theatlantic 
 .com/politics/archive/2018/09/elizabeth-warrens-fix-americas-housing-
crisis/571210/ [https://perma.cc/7UBX-KDCB] (discussing Senator Warren’s 
proposal for a competitive block-grant program to reward cities that 
reduce barriers to housing supply). 
222. Dense housing near transit has quantifiable benefits for greenhouse gas 
emissions and so localities that build denser development could be 
permitted to profit from that choice by selling offsets on the carbon 
market. See Ahlfeldt & Pietrostefani, supra note 3. At the moment, 
carbon-offset credits might not amount to a large incentive, but the 
number of allowances in California is set to steadily contract, and the 
price of allowances is expected to rise accordingly. By 2030, it is 
imaginable that the fiscal incentive to sell allowances might be quite 
significant. For some preliminary analysis, see Severin Borenstein et al., 
California’s Cap-and-Trade Market Through 2030: A Preliminary 
Supply/Demand Analysis (Energy Institute at Haas, Working Paper No. 
281, 2017), https://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/research/papers/WP281.pdf [https:// 
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